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Abstract
We build a comparable and bottom-up measure of CEO labor supply for 1,114 CEOs, and
investigate whether family and professional CEOs di↵er on this dimension of e↵ort. Family
CEOs work 9% fewer hours relative to professional CEOs. CEO hours worked are positively
correlated with firm performance, and account for 18% of the performance gap between family
and professional CEOs. We study the sources of the di↵erences in labor supply across family and
professional CEOs by exploiting firm and industry heterogeneity, and variation in meteorological
and sport events. The evidence suggests that family CEOs value–or can pursue–leisure activities
more than professional CEOs.
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1 Introduction
The debate over the desirability of the separation between firm ownership and control is as old as
the firm itself. Should firms be led by their owners or by professional managers? One of the main
arguments in favor of owners is that they have more at stake, and are thus expected to exert more
e↵ort at work. This is the standard prediction of the principal-agent model, as owners are residual
claimants over the income generated by the business and hence are motivated to succeed, other
things equal. The argument against is that, simply put, other things are not equal. For example,
CEOs with a significant ownership stake on the firm are likely to be wealthier than professional
CEOs–if leisure is a normal good, they may therefore demand more leisure.1 Equivalently, owner
CEOs may be able to pursue private interests at the expense of other stakeholders (Shleifer and
Vishny (1989))–if the pursuit of private interests crowds out activities that are beneficial to the
firm, this will also result in less managerial e↵ort. These factors may lead to owner CEOs being
less motivated to work hard relative to non-owners.
Family CEOs–i.e. managers with a majority ownership stake in the firm, who have either
founded the firm, or inherited the firm from the original founders–are a primary example of owner
CEOs and are widely present in both developed and developing countries (Caselli and Gennaioli
(2013), LaPorta et al. (1999)). In this paper, we explore di↵erences between family and professional
CEOs (i.e., non family a liated CEOs) in one basic metric of e↵ort: the number of hours they
work. We do so using a new survey instrument, which allows us to codify the diaries of 1,114 CEOs
of manufacturing firms across six countries: Brazil, France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom
and the United States. To measure the labor supply of CEOs, we reconstruct their time diaries
via daily phone interviews over the course of one week. We ask respondents (the CEOs themselves
or their personal assistants) to list sequentially all activities in their diaries longer than fifteen
minutes and to report details of those activities. This methodology allows us to build an accurate
bottom-up estimate of how much time CEOs allocate to business activities. Our methodology is
inspired by Mintzberg (1973) celebrated analysis of the work week of five CEOs, extended to large
random samples.2
1For example, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) show that large inheritances reduce labor force participation and labor
supply.
2“Shadowing” exercises are common in the management literature but typically cover a handful of observations.
To the best of our knowledge, the most extensive CEO time use study is still Mintzberg (1973) seminal work, which
comprises five CEOs. The largest observational dataset on top executives known to us –Kotter (1999)– includes 15
2
We find that there is substantial variation in the number of hours CEOs devote to work activities:
the average CEO in our sample spends 52 hours per week (10.4 hours per day) at work, while CEOs
in the bottom quartile work on average 44.2 hours per week, and those in the top quartile work
on average 58.5 hours per week. When we divide CEOs between family and professional CEOs–i.e.
managers who do not have significant ownership stakes in the firm–we find a large di↵erence in
hours worked: family CEOs, who account for 41% of our sample, record 6 fewer hours per week
relative to professional CEOs.
Are these di↵erences correlated with firm performance, and in particular with di↵erences in
firm performance between family and professional CEOs? To answer this question, we match the
CEO survey with accounting data. We show three related facts. First, CEO hours worked are
positively and significantly correlated with firm performance: a one standard deviation change in
CEO hours worked is associated with a 8% increase in firm productivity. Second, firms run by
family CEOs are on average less productive (and profitable) than firms run by professional CEOs.
Third, di↵erences in CEO hours worked account for up to 18% of the performance gap between
family and professional CEOs.
We develop a simple model of CEO labor supply to study why family and professional CEOs
vary in their e↵ort at work. The model illustrates that the observed cross sectional di↵erences in
hours worked across CEOs may depend on both di↵erences in the marginal product of CEO e↵ort
across governance types–i.e. di↵erences in CEO or firm characteristics that may make it uniquely
optimal for family CEOs to work fewer hours–and di↵erences in the CEO taste for leisure.
We assess the empirical relevance of these two alternative sources of variation by examining
whether the gap in hours worked between family and professional CEOs can be accounted for by
observable industry, firm and CEO characteristics which are likely to a↵ect the marginal product of
CEO e↵ort. The data suggest that these factors do not fully account for di↵erences in hours worked
between family and professional CEOs. Once we include the full set of firm, CEO, and industry
controls, family CEOs still work 9% fewer hours than their professional counterparts. Importantly,
we observe that professional CEOs who run family firms work as much as their counterparts in
general managers. The largest time use study of managerial personnel we are aware of is Luthans (1988), which
covers 44 mostly middle managers. Some surveys ask large numbers of CEOs general questions about their aggregate
time use (e.g. McKinsey (2013), but they are not based on an analysis of their agendas for a specific time period.
Karolyi and Liao (2015) collect data on the time spent by CEOs and CFOs in investor relations activities at 800
firms in 59 countries.
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non-family firms, suggesting that the di↵erence in hours worked is not due to family ownership per
se.
We then turn to analyze whether the di↵erence in behavior observed in the data are consistent
with heterogeneous preferences for leisure across CEOs. We do so by exploiting a key insight
provided by the model: if family CEOs choose to work fewer hours because they put a higher
weight on leisure relative to firm performance, then factors a↵ecting the opportunity cost of leisure
(or, symmetrically, the marginal cost of e↵ort) across all CEOs should have a greater impact on
family CEOs. To implement the empirical strategy suggested by the model, we study whether
the di↵erence in hours worked by family and professional CEOs varies with factors a↵ecting the
opportunity cost of leisure across firms, and across days of work. We use two alternative measures to
proxy for di↵erences in the opportunity cost of leisure across firms: firm size and the competitiveness
of the industry in which the firm operates. The opportunity cost of leisure is likely to be higher in
larger firms, as CEOs’ e↵ort a↵ects a larger volume of activity.3 The opportunity cost of leisure is
also likely to be higher in more competitive industries conditional on firm size, since competition
lowers the probability of survival and increases the importance of managerial e↵ort to keep the firm
in business. We show that the di↵erence in hours worked between family and professional CEOs is
significantly smaller in larger firms and in firms active in more competitive industries. Furthermore,
for two countries in our sample, India and Brazil, we are also able to measure variation in the
opportunity cost of labor across days, using daily variation in rainfall and the broadcasting of
popular sport events (Premier League cricket matches in India and State Football League matches
in Brazil). In this sub-sample, the di↵erence between family and professional CEOs is significantly
larger on days when torrential rains or popular sport matches increase the marginal cost of e↵ort.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the notion that family CEOs have di↵erent
preferences for leisure relative to professional CEOs. We speculate that the heterogeneity in pref-
erences across CEOs could be related to wealth e↵ects–namely, by the fact that family CEOs may
be wealthier than professional CEOs thanks to their ownership stake in the firm–and investigate
this hypothesis by exploiting cross country di↵erences in inheritance laws facilitating the intergen-
erational concentration of wealth.
3This is analogue to the “scale of operations” e↵ect discussed in Mayer (1960), which has been used to explain
how small di↵erences in ability can produce large di↵erences in pay when more able CEOs work for larger firms, see
e.g. Tervio (2008).
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While the cross sectional nature of our data limits our ability to make causal statements about
the relationship between CEO hours worked and firm performance, the evidence is consistent with
the idea that family CEOs may be willing to trade-o↵ profits for other non-monetary benefits of
control, such as the ability to enjoy more leisure (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Bandiera et al. (2015)).
Our findings complement the observation that family CEOs are less likely to adopt managerial best
practices (Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), Lemos and Scur (2017)) and are characterized by a
management style that is less conducive to shareholder value maximization (Mullins and Schoar
(2013)). In line with these literatures, our time use analysis shows that the incentives arising from
having a higher stake in the firm may be o↵set by other factors that induce less e↵ort on the part
of the CEOs. More broadly, our research illustrates one channel through which CEOs may a↵ect
firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Kaplan et al. (2012), Malmendier and Tate (2005),
Malmendier and Tate (2009), Schoar and Zuo (2011)). Finally, the paper is related to the strand
of work emphasizing the importance of preferences in explaining di↵erences in managerial e↵ort
(Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2009)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sampling and data collection method-
ology, together with the characteristics of CEOs and their firms. Section 3 discusses di↵erences in
hours worked across family and professional CEOs, as well as the relationship between firm perfor-
mance and CEO hours worked. Section 4 provides a simple model of CEO labor supply to guide
the empirical analysis. Section 5 estimates the di↵erence between family and professional CEOs
and implements the empirical strategy suggested by the model to interpret the observed di↵erences.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Labor Supply of CEOs: Measurement
2.1 The CEO Time Use Survey
To measure CEOs’ labor supply, we created a survey instrument that keeps track of the activities
undertaken by executives on a daily basis.4 We use this instrument to collect information for
a sample of CEOs over one work week. While titles may di↵er across countries (e.g. Managing
Director in the UK), we always interview the highest-ranking authority in charge of the organization
4A similar version of the survey was first used in a small scale study of about 100 Italian CEOs. See Bandiera
et al. (2012) for details.
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who has executive powers and reports to the board of directors. For brevity we refer to them as
CEOs in what follows.
The survey collects information on all the activities lasting 15 minutes or longer in the order
they happened during the day, with their starting and ending time and other activity details. Our
main measure of CEO labor supply is the sum of time devoted to work activities over the week.
To compare our diary measure with the standard recall measure used in other time use surveys,
we also asked CEOs to estimate the hours they worked during the same week. Figure A.1 in the
Appendix shows a screenshot of the survey tool.5
The data was collected by a team of enumerators we hired for this purpose through daily phone
calls with the Personal Assistant (PA) of the CEO, or with the CEO himself (43% of the cases),
over a week randomly chosen by us. On day one of this week, the enumerator called in the morning
and gathered detailed information on all the activities planned in the CEO diary for the day.
The enumerator then called again in the evening to gather information on the actual activities
undertaken by the CEO (including those that were not originally included in the planned agenda),
and the activities planned for the following day. On subsequent days, the enumerator called in the
evening, again to collect data on the actual activities undertaken during the day, and the planned
schedule for the next day.6 On the last day of the data collection, the analysts also interviewed the
CEO to validate the activity data (if collected through his PA) and to collect information on the
characteristics of the CEO and of the firm, including firm ownership and organizational structure.
Sampling frame
The survey covers CEOs in six of the world’s ten largest economies: Brazil, France, Germany, India,
the United Kingdom and the United States. For comparability, we chose to focus on established
market economies and opted for a balance between high and middle-low income countries. The
sampling frame was drawn from ORBIS, an extensive commercial data set produced by the company
Bureau Van Dijk that contains company accounts for more than 200 million companies around the
world. To maintain comparability of performance data, we restricted the sample to manufacturing
5The survey tool can be found online at www.executivetimeuse.org.
6For 70% of the CEOs in our sample, the work week consisted of 5 days. The remaining 30% of the CEOs also
reported to work during the weekend (21% for 6 days and 9% for 7 days). Analysts were instructed to call the CEO
after the weekend to retrieve data on Saturdays and Sundays.
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firms. We then selected firms with available sales and employment data.7 This yielded a sample of
6,527 firms in 32 two-digits SIC industries that we randomly assigned to di↵erent analysts to call
to seek the CEOs’ participation.
We were able to interview 1,131 CEOs, a response rate of 17%. This figure is at the higher end
of response rates for CEO surveys, which range between 9% and 16% (Graham et al. (2015)). Of
the interviewed CEOs, 17 were later dropped from the sample because of low data quality (typically
because the time use data covered less than 4 days of the week). Our final sample thus comprises
of 1,114 CEOs, of which there are 282 in Brazil, 115 in France, 125 in Germany, 356 in India, 87
in the UK and 149 in the US.
The selection analysis in Table A.1 in the Appendix shows that respondents have on average
lower log sales (coe cient -0.071, standard error 0.011). However, we do not find any significant se-
lection e↵ect on performance variables, such as sales over employees and return on capital employed
(ROCE).
Measurement concerns
Two measurement concerns are of note. First, we are able to measure only the activities that the
CEO is willing to report. The sign of the bias this creates is ambiguous. CEOs might indeed be
prone to overestimate the hours they work, e.g. by coding time spent in personal activities as work.
At the same time, we will not pick up activities that take place out of business hours unless they
are recorded in the CEO diary. To the extent that the CEO labor supply data is estimated with
error, this would create attenuation bias on the estimates.
Second, a week of detailed activity data might not be enough to capture typical CEO behavior.
The allocation of time across activities might just be a reflection of high frequency shocks to the
marginal cost or marginal product of time across CEOs. If so, the time use data would capture the
relevance of these shocks, rather than explicit managerial choices. If this were true, however, we
would expect little similarity in the way time is allocated within the week by the same CEO (i.e.
we would not see any within week autocorrelation in CEO time use). In contrast, we find a high
7We went from a random sample of 11,500 firms to 6,527 eligible ones after screening for firms for which we were
able to find CEO contact details and were still active. Among this set 1,009 were located in Brazil; 896 in Germany;
762 in France; 1,429 in India; 1,058 in the UK; 1,372 in the U.S. The lower number of firms screened in France and
Germany is due to the fact that the screening had to be done by native language RAs based in Boston, of which we
could only hire one for each country. The sample construction is described in detail in the Appendix.
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degree of autocorrelation in the average number of hours worked during the week by the CEOs.
A simple regression of the number of log(hours worked) on day t on the same variable measured
on day t  1 delivers a coe cient of .40, statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, CEO
fixed e↵ects explain 25% of the variance observed in the daily time use data.
Finally, at the end of the survey week, we ask CEOs to rank whether the week could be
considered “representative” of their usual work activity on a scale 1-10. Reassuringly, we observe
substantial heterogeneity in hours worked even if we restrict the sample to the 63% of CEOs who
score the survey week as highly representative (i.e. a score of 8, 9 or 10 out of 10). This is at
odds with the hypothesis that all observed variation is due to transitory shocks rather than actual
di↵erences in behavior.
Ownership
In our sample, 57% of the firms are owned by a family, 23% by disperse shareholders, 9% by private
individuals, and 7% by private equity.8 Family CEOs are CEOs who belong to the family that owns
the firm, and account for 41% of the sample. Of these, 329 (30% of the sample) are descendants of
the original founders, and 126 (11%) are the founders themselves.9 Detailed information of family
ownership, which we were able to collect for a subsample of firms,10 shows that the family firms
in our sample tend to have a very concentrated ownership structure: families own on average 64%
of the shares (66% at the median), and in 70% of the firms the family owns more than 50% of the
shares.
Professional CEOs are CEOs who have no family bond with the owners of the firm. These
account for 59% of the sample. Just over a quarter of them (16% of the sample) manage firms that
are owned by a family. Later this will allow us to separate the e↵ect of family ownership from the
e↵ect of family CEOs.11 43% of the firms are listed on the stock market.
8The classification assigns ownership to the largest shareholder with at least 25.01% of the shares. We classify a
firm as being owned by dispersed shareholders if no single entity, family or person owns at least 25.01% of the shares.
9In the robustness checks we investigate whether the main results vary between founders and descendants CEOs
and find them to follow a very similar behavior.
10We gathered detailed ownership data for 324 of the total sample of 493 firms owned by a family or a founder.
The 169 firms for which this data could not be retrieved are primarily (116) private firms located in Brazil, for which
the detailed ownership information could not be found neither in Orbis nor via manual web searches. The remaining
firms are located in France (3), Germany (5), India (38), UK (2) and US (5).
11The shares owned by the family are significantly higher (70% vs. 62%, di↵erence significant at the 1% level) when
the firm is family owned, but run by a professional CEO. Further details on our ownership measures are provided in
the Appendix.
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Figure 1: CEO weekly hours worked, diary measureFigure	1	-	Weekly	hours	worked,	diary	measure
Notes: The graph shows the histogram of total weekly hours worked (built from
actual	diary	data)	by	a	sample	of	1114	CEOs.
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1114 CEOs.
2.2 CEOs at Work: Basic Summary Statistics
Figure 1 shows the distribution of hours worked during the week using the diary method, namely
the sum of the duration of all the activities the CEO undertakes while at work. The average CEO
in our sample spends 52 hours per week (10.4 hours per day) at work, while CEOs in the bottom
quartile work on average 44.2 hours per week and those in the top quartile work on average 58.5
hours per week.
Figure 2 compares the diary measure with a recall measure that we obtained by asking CEOs
to estimate the number of hours worked at the end of the week.12 Three points are of note. First,
the distribution of the recall measure exhibits considerable bunching at round numbers, e.g. 26%
of the sample CEOs report working 50 hours, while the diary measure shown in Figure 1 exhibits
no bunching, i.e. no more than 1.5% of the sample take the same value. Second, the diary and the
recall measures are positively correlated, but the correlation is well below 1–regressing the recall
measure on the diary measure yields a coe cient of .50, significantly di↵erent from 1 with p-value
equal to 0.00. Third, the recall measure is larger than the diary measure for half of the CEOs whose
diary measure is below the mean, but only for 16% of the CEOs whose diary measure is above the
12The sample included in this analysis excludes India since we did not collect recall time use in the first wave of
the survey.
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Figure 2: CEO weekly hours worked, diary and recall measureFigure'2')'Weekly'hours'worked')'Recall'vs.'Diary'Measure
Notes: The graph shows the linear regression of total weekly hours worked (CEO
estimates recorded at the end of the data collection week) and actual hours
worked (built from diary data) for a sample of 758 CEOs (all CEOs in sample
excluding9India,9where9the9recall9question9was9not9asked).
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Notes: The graph shows the linear regression of total weekly hours worked (CEO estimates recorded at the end of
the data collection week) and actual hours worked (built from diary data) for a sample of 758 CEOs (all CEOs in
sample excluding India, where the recall question was not asked).
mean. Thus, the noise in the recall measure is not orthogonal to the actual hours recorded in the
diary–CEOs who work fewer hours are equally likely to over- or under estimate their hours worked
while those who work longer hours tend to underestimate it. Taken together, these comparisons
suggest that the bottom up estimate of CEO labor supply employed in the remainder of the paper
is likely to provide more meaningful and objective information on CEO hours worked than more
commonly used recall measures of labor supply.13
Table A.3 shows that total weekly hours worked are similar across countries and above 50 hours
per week on average (or above 9.8 hours a day) across all countries except India, where the average
number of hours worked across all CEOs is significantly lower (46 weekly hours, or 8.8 hours a day).
Overall, country fixed e↵ects are jointly significant at the 1% level and account for about 14% of
the variation in total hours worked observed in the data. In contrast, industry fixed e↵ects–while
being jointly significant at the 1% level–account for only 3% of the overall cross sectional variation
in total hours worked. In the main analysis we rely primarily on within country, within industry
13Robinson et al. (2011)discuss the impact of recollection biases in recall methods relative to the time-diary method.
This notwithstanding, the diary method may still fail to capture some activities or still allow respondents to overes-
timate the time they devote to other activities, so that the hours of work recorded in our survey should be seen as
a proxy of actual work hours. See Aguiar et al. (2012) for a comprehensive review of the growing literature in the
economics of time use.
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Figure 3: CEO hours worked: di↵erences between family and professional CEOs in
the raw data Figure'3')'Weekly'hours'worked,'Family'and'Professional'CEOs
Notes: The graph shows the kernel distribution of total weekly hours worked
(built from actual diary data) by a sample of 1114 CEOs, of which 458 classified
as9"family9CEOs",9and96569classified9as9"professional9CEOs".
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Notes: The graph shows the kernel distribution of total weekly hours worked (built from actual diary data) by a
sample of 1114 CEOs, of which 458 classified as ”family CEOs”, and 656 classified as ”professional CEOs”.
comparisons of CEO hours worked across di↵erent governance types.
3 The Labor Supply of CEOs: Family vs. Professional CEOs
3.1 Di↵erences in Hours Worked
Figure 3 plots the distribution of weekly hours worked by family and professional CEOs as they
appear in the raw data. While there is a wide heterogeneity in hours worked across both types of
CEOs, the distribution of hours worked by family CEOs is entirely shifted to the left relative to
professional CEOs. This is the main stylized fact documented in this paper.
Table 1 provides some additional summary statistics to better qualify the nature of this di↵er-
ence. The first and second rows report the recall and diary measures of hours worked described
earlier. By both measures family CEOs work fewer hours, but importantly the di↵erence is much
larger (6.2 vs 3.6 hours) when we use the diary measure, as family CEOs tend to overestimate their
time at work while professional CEOs underestimate it.14
14Note that the recall measure is more prone to be biased by systematic misreporting (Robinson et al. (2011)).
Therefore, this finding allays the possible concern that the di↵erence in hours worked between family and professional
CEOs may be driven by professional CEOs intentionally overstating their e↵ort at work.
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The di↵erence remains stable (6.8 hours) when we only count work activities (that is dropping
travel time and personal time) that last longer than 15 minutes. The di↵erence between governance
types is due to two factors. Family CEOs start working later in the morning–at 9.16AM vs. 8.31AM
for professional managers–and devote a larger share of time to personal activities during business
hours (12.3% vs 8.6%).
3.2 Hours Worked and Firm Performance
The data shows a large statistically significant di↵erences in hours worked across CEOs, but are
these di↵erences interesting from an economic perspective? To provide some evidence on this point,
we examine three related issues. First, are there are performance di↵erences between family and
professional CEOs? Second, do CEO hours worked correlate with firm performance? And, finally,
to what extent do di↵erences in CEO hours worked account for the performance gap between family
and professional CEOs?
To examine these questions, we match the CEO survey data with firm-level accounting data
extracted from the Bureau Van Dijk’s ORBIS database. This database provides digitized and
comparable company accounts covering very large samples of private and publicly listed firms.15
We start by considering firm productivity as a proxy for firm performance (Syverson (2011)), and
estimate by OLS a basic production function of the form:
yit = ↵
FFam+ ↵llit + ↵
kkit + ↵
hhi +  
0
Zit + uit (1)
where yit are sales, lit is labor, kit capital of firm i at time t and lower case letters denote natural
logarithms. CEO log hours worked are denoted by hi.
We restrict the analysis to the years in which the manager we interviewed had the role of CEO,
and for each firm we keep the three most recent years prior to the survey year to avoid selection on
CEOs with longer tenure.16 We include year and country by industry (at the two digit SIC level)
15See the Appendix for details.
16It is important to note that this approach does not condition on the CEO being present for all three cross-sections
years to avoid selection on CEO longevity. Instead, we include a firm even if we can only observe performance data
only for one of the three cross-sections, such that we can potentially include also CEOs that have been recently
appointed. In the largest sample (Table 2, columns 1 and 2) we work with and unbalanced panel with 617 firms,
each observed for at most three years, for a total of 1,415 firm*year observations. Of these 617 firms, 151 have only
one cross section of data, 134 have two cross sections and 332 have three cross sections. We obtain similar results
if, instead of working with repeated cross sections and clustering at the firm level, we use one cross section per firm
(either the year with the most recent accounting data relative to the survey, or a simple average across the most
recent three years of data). Results available upon request.
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dummies throughout, as well as a set of interview noise controls to control for measurement error
in the time use variables,17 and cluster the standard errors by firm throughout the table.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2. Column 1 shows that firms run by family CEOs
in our sample are on average less productive than those run by professional CEOs. The di↵erence
in log sales controlling for employment and capital between firms run by family CEOs and those
run by professional managers is -0.190 log points (standard error 0.071), which translates in a 20%
productivity gap with firms run by professional CEOs.18 The coe cient on capital and employment
are both precisely estimated and within the expected range of magnitude (0.336, standard error
0.031 for capital and 0.555, standard error 0.041 for labor).
Column 2 shows that hours worked by the CEO are correlated with performance. The asso-
ciation between hours worked and productivity is positive and precisely estimated: a 10% change
in weekly hours worked is associated with a 3.3% increase in productivity.19 Furthermore, the
inclusion of CEO hours worked reduces the coe cient on the family CEO dummy by 18%, sug-
gesting that the di↵erence in hours worked account for almost a fifth of the productivity gap. We
repeat the exercise using the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator of productivity in columns 3 and 4,
finding consistent results: firms run by family CEO are on average less productive than firms run
by professional CEO, di↵erences in CEO hours worked are positively associated with productivity,
and account for about 20% of the productivity gap between family and professional CEO firms.
Columns 5 to 8 reveal a similar pattern when we use profits per employee and ROA as metrics
17The noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was recorded by the PA; 55 interviewer
dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a
self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote weeks with
a national or religious holiday. As expected, these controls improve the precision of the estimates of the coe cient
on CEO hours worked, but the results are robust to their exclusion. To the extent that our measures reflect time use
shocks that hit in that particular week or biases in reporting time use that are orthogonal to yearly firm outcomes,
the estimated coe cient on CEO hours worked will be biased towards zero.
18This result is in line with previous research on family run firms by Morck et al. (1988), Smith and Amoako-
Adu (1999), Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006), and Bennedsen et al. (2007). Anderson and Reeb (2003), in contrast, report
that public firms with a large block held by an individual or family on average are assigned higher values by public
shareholders. However, it is worth noting that the positive e↵ect of family ownership documented in Anderson and
Reeb (2003) tapers o↵ from shares of family ownership of 30% and above, and turns negative at about 60%. Since,
as discussed earlier, the share of family ownership in the family firms in our sample is very high (66% at the median),
the two sets of results are in fact consistent with each other. The results di↵er to some extent from Villalonga and
Amit (2006a), in that we find a negative correlation between firm performance and family control even when the
CEO is a founder (in Villalonga and Amit (2006a), the negative e↵ect of family CEOs emerged only for second
generation CEOs and onwards). A possible reason for this discrepancy stands in the fact that our sample includes a
large fraction of private firms in six countries, while Villalonga and Amit (2006a) focus on listed US firms only.
19For comparison, a one standard deviation change in capital would be associated with a 46% increase in produc-
tivity, while a standard deviation change in log CEO hours worked would result in an increase by 8%.
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of firm profitability, and Tobin’s Q in columns 9 and 10, which is available for the subset of listed
firms in the sample. In Appendix Table A.4 we report similar results using inputs rather than
outputs as dependent variables (log investments and log average wages).
Overall, these findings show the presence of a significant relationship between the CEO owning,
or being part of the family that owns the firm, working fewer hours, and worse firm performance.
The evidence of a positive correlation between CEO e↵ort and firm performance is–to the best of
our knowledge–novel.20 The vast literature on the CEO agency problem initiated by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) is consistent with many interpretations of CEO e↵ort, such as refraining from
empire building or from consuming on-the-job perks. The presence of a strong correlation between
hours worked and firm performance suggests that a literal interpretation of e↵ort as being present
at work may have explanatory power as well.21 Our findings are also consistent with the idea that
di↵erences in hours worked between family and professional CEOs may be one of the causal factors
behind the performance di↵erences between family and professional CEO firms. Unfortunately,
however, the direction of causality behind these relationships cannot be pinned down using cross-
sectional data. For example, CEO hours worked may have no direct e↵ect of firm performance,
but more productive firms might demand more CEO e↵ort, or unobservably more productive firms
may be more likely to hire CEOs who happen to work longer hours.22
20Pencavel (2014) examines the correlation between hours of work and productivity among munition workers.
21This is in line with Malmendier and Tate’s (2009) finding that CEOs who receive business awards are more likely
to devote time to outside activities.
22Note that unobserved heterogeneity across firms may also a↵ect the estimation of the coe cient ↵F in Equation
1 (i.e., the coe cient on the family CEO dummy). Bennedsen et al. (2007), for example, show that correcting for
the endogeneity and omitted variable concerns in the choice of a family CEO leads to a large reduction in the ↵F
coe cient, i.e. the appointment of a family CEO is more likely when unobserved firm performance is expected to
improve. Extrapolating their results to our sample, this would imply that the OLS coe cient on ↵F shown in Table 2
may be upward biased. While this hypothesis is certainly plausible, three pieces of evidence alleviate the endogeneity
concerns about ↵F in our sample. First, the magnitude of the productivity gap between family and professional
CEOs estimated with OLS is very similar to the one obtained using the Olley Pakes estimator of productivity, which
takes into consideration endogeneity biases in the production function estimation. Second, we are able to observe firm
performance before the CEO was appointed (363 firms) and, in this subsample, we do not find evidence of di↵erential
pre-appointment trends in performance between family and professional CEOs, even when focusing on professional
CEOs replacing a family CEO (see Appendix Table A.5). Third, if unobserved productivity were positively correlated
with CEO hours, including it as an additional regressor in Equation 1 would lead to a further decrease in the ↵F
coe cient, which is opposite to what we observe in Table 2. On a related note, we also considered whether the
reduction of the coe cient ↵F when CEO hours worked are included in the production function could be driven by
systematic di↵erences in reporting biases between family and professional CEOs. Two pieces of evidence, however,
suggest that mismeasurement does not systematically vary across governance types. First, the correlation between
actual and self-reported hours is not statistically di↵erent across governance types (the coe cient on the regression
of log perceived hours worked on log actual hours worked is 0.54 (se 0.07) for family CEOs and 0.49 (se 0.04) for
professional CEOs, and the di↵erence is not significant). Second, we examined whether family and professional CEOs
varied in terms of the representativeness of the week chosen for the data collection using a self-reported measure that
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In what follows we abstract completely from the challenge of estimating the causal e↵ect of
CEO e↵ort on firm performance. Instead, we focus on a more specific question, which is: taking it
as a given that the variation in CEO e↵ort will to some extent reflect firm specific characteristics,
including di↵erences in firm performance, is there any role left for individual CEO preferences in
explaining the di↵erence in hours worked across CEOs? In particular, is it possible that family
CEOs may have a di↵erent preference for leisure relative to professional CEOs? In the next section
we present a simple model to guide the empirical investigation of these questions.
4 A Simple Model of CEO Labor Supply
The model contains two main elements: a production function that depends on CEO work time,
as mediated by a) the characteristics of the CEO and the firm and; b) CEO preferences. Time
allocated to an activity is taken as a proxy for CEO attention which, as in Geanakoplos and Milgrom
(1991), is akin to a factor of production and matches the empirical model in equation (1).
Starting with technology, the performance of a firm is given by:
ygs = ygs + (ag + bs)hgs  
1
2
h2gs (2)
where g 2 {F, P} indicate the type of CEO–family or professional–and s 2 {L,H} denotes a binary
state of the world, to be discussed later. Firm performance–ygs–depends on the number of hours
that the CEO works, hgs. The marginal e↵ect of a CEO hour depends on his type (ag), and the
state of the world (bs). The negative quadratic term captures the idea that the marginal return of
CEO time is decreasing. Firm performance may also depend directly on the CEO type and on the
state of the world through ygs.
Note that the only restriction that our formulation imposes, by having additive ag and bs rather
than a generic ags, is that the identity of the CEO does not interact directly with the state of the
world in determining the marginal e↵ect of CEO time on performance. In the model, we do not
take a stand on whether performance is innately higher or lower in firms run by family CEOs or
professional CEOs: yFs can be greater or smaller than yPs. We also remain agnostic as to whether
the return to CEO time is higher or lower for family compared to professional CEOs: aF can be
greater or smaller than aP . For example, the marginal productivity of a professional CEO might
we collect from the CEO when reviewing the data. This variable is also not statistically di↵erent across family and
professional CEOs.
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be di↵erent from that of a family CEO because the family CEO can delegate more easily to other
family members who are more likely to work for the firm.
CEO utility depends on the performance of the firm and on the cost of spending time at work:
ugs = cgy   dshgs,
where cg represents the relative weight of firm performance and work hours in the preference of a
CEO of type g;23 and ds captures the possibility that the cost of e↵ort, or the opportunity cost of
leisure, depends on the state of the world common across all CEOs.24
In this simple set-up, given technology and preferences, the number of hours maximizing CEO
payo↵ is derived as:
h⇤gs = ag + bs  
ds
cg
(3)
Equation (3) illustrates the primary identification challenge we face in a cross sectional setting,
and that were briefly discussed in Section 3.2. Namely, di↵erences between the hours worked
by family and professional CEOs can be due to either di↵erences in firm or CEO characteristics
that vary across governance types and determine the marginal product of CEO’s hours (ag) or by
di↵erences in the relative weight the CEO assigns to firm performance (cg).
The model, however, also provides a key insight that can be used to identify at least the sign
of the di↵erence between cF and cP . More specifically, factors that a↵ect the opportunity cost of
leisure/marginal cost of e↵ort ds to the same extent for both CEO types can be used to identify
di↵erences in managerial preferences (i.e. whether cg e↵ectively di↵ers across CEOs). To see this,
suppose that the cost of e↵ort is higher (or the opportunity cost of leisure lower) in state H than
in state L (dH > dL). In this case, we can show that, even if a change in the state of the world may
a↵ect the marginal productivity of CEO work through bs, the sign of the di↵erence-in-di↵erences
depends on the preference parameter cg only:
Proposition 1. The di↵erence in di↵erence in hours worked over CEO type and state of the world
has the same sign as the di↵erence in the preference parameter of family CEOs and professional
23Di↵erences in cg may be innate to the CEO or compensation related. For example, di↵erent governance types
may be associated with di↵erences in performance-related pay.
24Note that the utility function can be rewritten as ugs =
cg
ds
y   hgs. Therefore, the parameter ds captures
di↵erences in the trade-o↵ between firm performance and leisure.
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CEOs. Formally, if dH>dL then h⇤PH   h⇤FH > h⇤PL   h⇤FL if and only if cP>cF .25
Intuitively, if preferences are the same across CEOs, and the di↵erence between family and
professional CEOs is solely driven by the marginal product of CEO time ag, an increase in the
marginal cost of e↵ort ds that a↵ects both types equally should make both types reduce hours
worked to the same extent, leaving their di↵erence constant. By the same logic, if the di↵erence in
hours worked across CEOs instead increases with ds, this is consistent with the idea that family
CEOs have a stronger preference for leisure relative to firm performance.
We take this approach to the data in the next section.
5 Why do Family CEOs Work Less than Professional Managers?
5.1 The Role of Firm, CEO and Industry Characteristics
In line with earlier work (e.g. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006)), family CEOs are di↵erent in other dimensions
besides how long they work. This is shown in Table 3, Panels A, B and C. Panel A shows that
family and professional CEOs have similar demographics: the average CEO is 51 years old and
96% of CEOs are men. However, the share of family CEOs with a college degree and/or an MBA is
significantly lower relative to professional managers (90% vs. 94% for a college degree, p-value <.1,
and 43% vs 63% for an MBA degree, p-value<.01). Family CEOs are also less likely to have worked
abroad (39% vs. 54% , p-value<.01) and more likely to have longer tenure both as CEOs (16 vs 7
years, p-value<.01) and in other positions with the same firm (23 vs 13 years, p-value<.01).
Panel B shows that the average firm has 1,571 employees and that family CEOs manage smaller
firms (1,037 vs 1,945 employees, p-value>.1). 24% of the sample firms are part of foreign multina-
tionals, and these are less likely to be managed by family CEOs (19% vs 28%, p-value<.01). The
organization of the firm also di↵ers: family CEOs have fewer direct reports (7.4 vs 8, p-value<.05)
and are also less likely to have a COO (18% vs 31%, p-value<.01), while they are much more likely
to have their o↵springs in executive positions within the firm (.24 sons and .10 daughters vs. .005
and .006, p-values<.01).
25Proof. Given the optimal h and the assumption that dH>dL,
sign [h⇤FL   h⇤FH   (h⇤NL   h⇤NH)] = sign
h
dH
cF
  dLcF  
dH
cN
+ dLcN
i
= sign
h
 
⇣
1
cN
  1cF
⌘
(dH   dL)
i
= sign [cN   cF ]
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Finally, Panel C describes the external environment in which these firms operate. 57% of the
sample firms are located in emerging economies (India or Brazil), with this number being higher
for firms led by family CEOs (78% vs 43%, p-value<.01). The sample firms are distributed across
32 di↵erent two digits SIC sectors, the largest of which, SIC 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products),
accounts for 13% of the firms. The distribution of family and professional CEOs are generally
balanced across sectors. We reject the null that the sector dummies do not predict CEO type only
for 4 out of the 32 sectors, three of which account for less than 2% of the sample each. Family
and professional CEOs also face a similar level of product market competition, as measured by
the Lerner Index, which is defined as (1-profit/sales) calculated as the average across the entire
population of firms in Orbis in the sample countries for the 5 years preceding the data collection,
and is specific to the firm three digit industry (Aghion et al. (2005)). We obtain similar results when
we use the degree of import penetration as a proxy for product market competition, measured as
the share of total imports relative to domestic production in the industry in which the firm operates,
also aggregated up at the industry level.26
To assess the relevance of these factors in accounting for the gap in hours worked between family
and professional CEOs, we estimate an empirical version of equation (3), i.e.:
hijc = ↵
FFami + Ci  + Fi  +  jc + "ijc (4)
Where hijc is the log of total weekly hours worked by CEO i in industry j in country c, Fami
equals 1 if firm i is owned by a family and the CEO belongs to the family, while Fami = 0 if
firm i is led by a professional CEO regardless of ownership status, C,F are vectors of CEO and
firm characteristics,  jc are industry by country fixed e↵ects. We examine the extent to which the
magnitude and the significance of the coe cient ↵F is a↵ected by the inclusion of these controls
(robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis under the coe cients).
The results are shown in Table 4. Column 1 shows that the unconditional di↵erence between the
hours worked of family and professional CEOs is 16% (0.18 log points). Column 2 shows that one
third of this di↵erence is due to di↵erences across countries, namely CEOs in emerging economies
record fewer hours and family CEOs are more likely to be located there (more details on country
di↵erences are shown in Table A.3). Adding country by 2 digit SIC industry fixed e↵ects reduces
26See Section A.3 in the Appendix for more information on the construction of the Lerner and the import penetration
variables.
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Table 3: Family and professional CEOs: di↵erences in manager and firm characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel	A.	CEO	characteristics All Family	CEOs
Professional	
CEOs
Difference	
(3)-(2)
(T-statistic)
Age 50.930 50.562 51.187 0.625			
(8.458) (9.738) (7.425) (1.21)			
Male	(=1	if	CEO	is	male) 0.961 0.950 0.970 0.0197			
(0.193) (0.219) (0.172) (1.68)			
College	degree	(=1	if	CEO	has	a	college	degree) 0.925 0.904 0.939 0.0351*		
(0.264) (0.295) (0.239) (2.19)			
MBA	(=1	if	CEO	has	been	awarded	an	MBA) 0.548 0.430 0.631 0.201***
(0.498) (0.496) (0.483) (6.76)			
Tenure	as	CEO		(number	of	years) 10.298 15.586 6.602 -8.984***
(9.550) (10.514) (6.677) (-17.40)			
Tenure	in	firm	(number	of	years) 17.116 22.862 13.119 -9.742***
(11.597) (10.497) (10.611) (-15.11)			
Experience	abroad	(=1	if	CEO	has	had	worked	experience	abroad) 0.482 0.393 0.544 0.151***
(0.500) (0.489) (0.498) (5.02)			
CEO	holds	positions	in	other	firms	(=1	if	CEO	hold	managerial	positions	in	other	firms) 0.418 0.456 0.392 -0.0646*		
(0.494) (0.499) (0.489) (-2.15)			
Panel	B.	Firm	characteristics
Domestic	or	Foreign	Multinational	(=1	if	firm	is	owned	by	a	foreign	or	domestic	MNE) 0.242 0.188 0.280 0.0927***
(0.429) (0.391) (0.450) (3.57)			
Number	of	Employees 1571.051 1036.575 1945.432 908.9			
(10127.428) (3660.922) (12837.271) (1.47)			
Firm	age 49.185 43.295 53.320 10.02***
(45.360) (31.940) (52.412) (3.64)
Listed	status 0.432 0.544 0.354 	-0.190***
(0.496) (0.499) (0.478) (-6.41)
Number	of	CEO	direct	reports 7.775 7.389 8.044 0.656**	
(3.774) (3.979) (3.604) (2.86)			
COO	(=1	if	COO	exists) 0.259 0.177 0.317 0.140***
(0.439) (0.382) (0.466) (5.32)			
Number	of	sons	in	management	positions 0.103 0.245 0.005 -0.240***
(0.304) (0.430) (0.068) (-14.04)			
Number	of	daughters	in	management	positions 0.043 0.096 0.006 -0.0900***
(0.203) (0.295) (0.078) (-7.45)			
Data	collected	through	the	CEO	personal	assistant 0.428 0.373 0.466 0.0931**	
(0.495) (0.484) (0.499) (3.10)			
Panel	C.	External	Environment
Located	in	emerging	economies	(=1	if	India	or	Brazil) 0.573 0.779 0.428 -0.351***
(0.495) (0.415) (0.495) (-12.43)
Lerner	Index 1.227 1.225 1.229 0.00337			
(0.412) (0.419) (0.408) (0.13)			
Import	Penetration 0.614 0.638 0.597 -0.0406			
(0.566) (0.623) (0.523) (-1.12)			
Number	of	Observations 1114 458 656
Notes: The table shows summary statistics (means, standard deviation in parentheses in columns 1-3; di↵erences
and t-statistic in parentheses in column 4) of CEO characteristics, firm and industry level data for the sample CEOs.
Family CEOs are those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm. All variables in Panel A and B
collected in the CEO time use survey. Import penetration = ln(import/production) in the firm ISIC REV3 industry,
computed by averaging OECD STAN data relative to the 2006–2008 time period (last available year for all countries)
across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level. Lerner index of competition = (1-profit/sales) in the firm
3 digit SIC industry computed, as in Aghion et al. (2005), by averaging firm level data in ORBIS relative to the
2008-2012 time period across Brazil, France, Germany, India, US and UK at the industry level.
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Table 4: Di↵erences in hours worked between family and professional CEOs controlling
for CEO, industry and firm characteristicsTable&2&(&Family&vs.&Professional&CEOs&(&Cross&sectional&differences&in&Hours&Worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent&Variable
Family&CEO !0.180*** !0.111*** !0.106*** !0.102*** !0.088*** !0.088*** !0.078***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Family&Ownership,&External&CEO 0.029
(0.019)
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms 0.022 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Log(CEO&age) !0.165*** !0.181*** !0.138*** !0.143*** !0.147***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Log(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) !0.004 !0.007 !0.007 !0.006 !0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
CEO&holds&College&degree 0.052 0.044 0.041 0.054* 0.053
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
CEO&holds&MBA&degree 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
CEO&has&study/work&experience&abroad 0.016 0.006 0.004 !0.003 !0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Log(Employment) 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Firm&age) 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
MNE 0.029 0.024 0.033* 0.033*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Listed !0.033 !0.032 !0.009 !0.005
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
COO&exists !0.009 !0.018 !0.017
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions !0.049** !0.060*** !0.060***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions 0.004 !0.013 !0.013
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant !0.001 !0.000
(0.017) (0.017)
R(squared 0.118 0.212 0.229 0.245 0.256 0.347 0.348
Number&of&firms 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114
Country*Industry&dummies n y y y y y y
Noise&controls n n n n n y y
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust standard errors in parenthesis). The
variable "CEO Hours Worked" is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel)
during the survey week. The variable "CEO Hours Worked ! Recall Measure" is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities as
recalled by the CEO at the end of the survey week. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0
otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was recorded by the
PA; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a self
reportedZscoreZgivenZbyZtheZCEOZtoZrankZtheZrepresentativenessZofZtheZweekZandZaZdummyZtoZdenoteZweeksZwithZaZnationalZorZreligiousZholiday.
Log(Hours&Worked)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust
standard rrors in parenthesis). The variable ”CEO Hours Work d” is the log f the total h urs the CEO devoted
to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey week. Family CEO=1 for those
who own the firm or belong to the family that o ns the firm, and 0 oth rwise. Fa ily Ownership, External CEO=1
for professional CEOs working in firms owned by a family, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits
SIC codes. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was recorded by the PA; 55 interviewer
dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a
self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote weeks with
a national or religious holiday.
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the di↵erence from 16% to 11%.
Column 3 shows that older CEOs work fewer hours (coe cient on log CEO age is -0.165,
significant at the 1% level). While proxies for CEO skills (college degree dummy, MBA dummy,
and an indicator to denote CEOs with work experience abroad) are all positively but only weakly
correlated with hours worked. The inclusion of these additional controls leaves the coe cient on
the family CEO dummy unchanged.
In Column 4 we examine the association between industry and firm characteristics and CEO
hours worked by including a set of variables likely to a↵ect the magnitude and the complexity of
CEO workload such as firm size (in terms of employees), firm age and a dummy denoting firms that
are either domestic or foreign multinationals to capture the possibility of extended working hours
due to the necessity of managing across di↵erent time zones. Among these variables, only firm size
is positively and significantly correlated with CEO hours worked. A 10% increase in firm size is
associated with a 0.25% increase in CEO hours worked.27 Overall, however, industry fixed e↵ects,
CEO and firm characteristics explain a small portion of the di↵erence in hours worked between
family and professional CEOs, which remains unchanged in magnitude even when these additional
controls are included.
Column 5 controls for firm organizational features, i.e. the number of CEO direct reports, a
dummy to denote the presence of a COO, and the number of sons and/or daughters employed in
senior managerial positions. These variables are of particular interest for our purposes, since they
di↵er systematically between firms managed by family and professional CEOs–as shown in Table
3–and may at the same time significantly shape overall the demands on CEO time.28 Di↵erences in
organizational structure are indeed correlated with CEO hours worked. Namely, CEOs who have a
larger number of direct reports work longer hours, while those whose sons hold senior management
positions in the firm work fewer hours. Di↵erences in organizational structure reduce the coe cient
on family CEOs by 2 percentage points, but this remains economically and statistically significant.
27For a subsample of firms, we were able to build alternative measures of firm size based on accounting data using
information of firm level sales. We also investigated whether the di↵erences in hours worked could be accounted
for di↵erent growth rates–rather than levels–of sales. We found similar results, namely that CEO hours worked are
higher in larger firms, but that does not account for the di↵erences between family and professional CEOs. CEO
hours worked are positively but not significantly correlated with the growth rate of firm sales, and the inclusion of
the variable does not a↵ect the family CEO dummy (see Appendix Table A.7 for details).
28For example, the presence of other family members in top managerial positions may facilitate the distribution of
CEO workload across a team of trusted managers (Bloom et al. (2013)). These organizational decisions may clearly
also be endogenous to CEO e↵ort.
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Column 6 further probes the result to the inclusion of the set of interview noise controls included
in the production function results in Table 2 to proxy for systematic di↵erences in measurement
error across CEO types. Reassuringly, the inclusion of these controls leaves the magnitude and
the significance of the family CEO dummy unchanged. We also note that there is no correlation
between the identity of the survey respondent (the PA or the CEO himself) and hours worked,
which allays concerns that PAs have more limited information or that CEOs who choose to report
their own time use overstate hours worked.29
Since 16% of the sample firms are owned by a family and managed by a professional CEO we
can separately identify the e↵ect of family CEOs from the e↵ect of family ownership. Column 7
shows that professional CEOs working in firms owned by a founder or a family are statistically
indistinguishable from other professional CEOs. This finding is important, as it suggests that the
di↵erences in hours worked between family and professional CEOs are not due to factors related to
family ownership per-se, but are tightly linked to the presence of a family a liated manager.
Robustness Checks
Table A.6 in the Appendix shows a battery of robustness checks, including expressing CEO hours
worked in levels, using a negative binomial regressions to take into account the count nature of the
hours data, estimating the regression separately for developing (Brazil and India) and developed
(France, Germany, UK and US) economies, and the first wave of the survey (which focused on India
exclusively) and the second wave of the survey (in which all the other countries were covered). The
magnitude and significance of the family CEO dummy are remarkable stable across methods and
samples.
Founder CEOs
In the main analysis, first and second generation family CEOs are grouped together in the family
CEO category. It is however possible, as shown in earlier research (e.g. Villalonga and Amit
29The coe cient remains stable at .088 even if we include all the other noise controls but we remove the variable
capturing the identity of the respondent. To address measurement issue concerns, we also replicated the analysis
using a recall measure of hours worked, rather than the actual diary based measure. This is because, with significant
reporting biases, we would expect the di↵erence in hours worked between family and professional CEOs to be larger
when using the recall measure, which is easier to manipulate. In contrast with this hypothesis, we find that the
estimated di↵erence in hours worked between family and professional CEOs is smaller when we use the recall measure.
This is consistent with the fact that–as shown in Table 1–family CEOs are more likely to overstate hours worked
relative to professional CEOs.
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(2006b)), that founder CEOs (i.e. first generation family CEOs) may be systematically more
inclined to exert more e↵ort on the job, due to a stronger attachment to the company or higher
skills.
Therefore, in Appendix Tables A.8 and A.9 we explore whether the results vary when we con-
sider first and second generation family CEOs separately, i.e. founders separately from descendants.
Table A.8 shows that, unconditionally, founders work 1.3 fewer hours per week relative to profes-
sional CEOs, but they are also are older, less educated, have longer tenure and are mostly located
in emerging economies. Once all observable characteristics are controlled for, Columns 5 and 6 in
Table A.9 show that both founder and descendant CEOs a liated with the owning family work
9% fewer hours than professional CEOs.
While it is important to notice that the founders managed firms in our sample are not start-
ups (the average founder has been managing his firm for 22 years), the finding that founder and
descendant CEOs behave similarly is, to our knowledge, novel. This is in line with recent findings
that both adopt worse managerial practices (Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)) and that they share
a similar business philosophy and firm governance (Mullins and Schoar (2013)).
Summary
Taken together, the evidence presented so far does not support the idea that the firm or managerial
characteristics a↵ecting the marginal product of CEO time–ag in the terminology of the model–are
the sole drivers of the observed di↵erences in hours worked across CEOs. First, the correlation
between any of these variables and hours worked is an order of magnitude smaller than the e↵ect
of CEO type. Second, di↵erences in CEO and firm observable characteristics, including family
ownership, explain only about half of the di↵erence in total hours between family and professional
CEOs.30
The remaining gap in hours worked might be due to other unobservable di↵erences that are
specific to family firms, but only when managed by family CEOs, and/or to di↵erences in the
preferences of the CEOs. We attempt to disentangle these two potential sources of variation in
Section 5.2 below.
30To see this, compare the coe cient on the family CEO dummy in Table 4, Column 1 with the one in Column 7.
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5.2 CEO Preferences
Heterogeneity across Firms
Proposition 1 of the model suggests that di↵erences in managerial preferences across CEOs should
result in di↵erential responses with respect to variations in the opportunity cost of leisure common
across across all CEOs. We investigate this idea by examining two factors that should a↵ect the
CEO opportunity cost of leisure: firm size and the level of competition the firm is exposed to.
In both cases, the intuition is straightforward. The opportunity cost of leisure is likely to be
higher in larger firms because the CEO controls a larger volume of activity. Therefore, the marginal
hour of leisure deprives more people of the input of the CEO, and each decision not taken during
that hour has larger monetary value. This is akin to the “scale of operations” e↵ect (Mayer (1960)).
Symmetrically, the opportunity cost of leisure is likely to be higher in more competitive settings,
because the baseline probability of survival is lower, and CEO e↵ort is more likely to be essential
to keep the firm in business. The marginal hour of leisure can make the di↵erence between firm
death and survival in competitive industries while its consequences are less dire for firms that are
sheltered from competition.
Table 5 reports the estimates of
hijc = ↵
FFami +  Fami ⇤Xij +  Xij + Ci'+ Fi +  jc + "ijc (5)
where Xij is a measure of firm i size, or a measure of competition in industry j, and all
other variables are as defined above. Proposition 1 makes clear that, under the assumption that
the opportunity cost of leisure is higher in larger firms and in more competitive industries, the
di↵erence in di↵erence parameter   has the same sign as the di↵erence in preferences between
professional and family CEOs. Namely,  > 0 implies that, compared to family CEOs, professional
CEOs put more weight on firm performance relative to leisure.
In Table 5 we use two measures of firm size, number of employees and revenues, and two measures
of competition, the Lerner index and import penetration, both defined at the industry (SIC 3
and ISIC Rev1, respectively) level. The estimates in columns 1 to 4 reveal a consistent picture:
when the opportunity cost of leisure is higher, the di↵erence in hours worked between family and
professional CEOs is smaller. The estimates of   are positive and statistically di↵erent from zero
for all four measures, and the magnitudes are economically meaningful. The di↵erence between
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family and professional CEOs is 12% (11%) in firms at the 10th percentile of the distribution of log
employment (log sales) but only 4% (5%) in firms at the 90th percentile of the same distribution.
Thus, family CEOs in large firms work almost as much as their professional counterparts, while
those in small firms work significantly less. Likewise, the di↵erence between family and professional
CEOs is 10% in low competition industries at the 10th percentile of the Lerner (import penetration)
index but only 5% in high competition industries at the 90th percentile. These magnitudes are
almost identical when we consider import penetration as an alternative proxy for competition.
In light of Proposition 1, the estimates with respect to size and competition are consistent
with a scenario in which family CEOs put lower weight on firm performance relative to leisure,
that is cP > cF . However, an observationally equivalent explanation is that there is a distribution
of preferences for leisure among family CEOs, and variation in the opportunity cost of leisure at
the firm or industry level determines sorting, so that leisure-loving family CEOs are only found in
small firms and low-competition industries. In this case, leisure-loving family CEOs drop out rather
than working longer hours, although note that di↵erences in preferences still explain di↵erences in
hours worked. The next subsection exploits variation in the cost of e↵ort across days to shed light
on whether family and professional CEOs adjust their hours di↵erently in response to exogenous
shocks.
Heterogeneity across Days
For the two largest of our sample countries–India and Brazil– we are able to exploit shocks a↵ecting
the cost of CEO e↵ort during our sample week. In these two countries, the data collection period
coincided with intense rainfall days (especially in India, in which it overlapped with the onset and
early development of the monsoon rainfall season) and with popular sports tournaments (cricket
in India and soccer in Brazil). These events a↵ect the cost of e↵ort on some days but not on
others and, crucially, a↵ect both family and non family CEOs in the sample. These features of
the shocks provide enough variation to identify whether CEOs display a di↵erential reaction to the
same exogenous shocks.
Extreme rainfall disrupts local transportation in urban areas (where most of the CEOs in our
sample are located), adding delays and inconveniences that increase the cost of e↵ort. We obtain
rainfall data for all the major weather stations in India and Brazil for the period in which the
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Table 5: Firm Size and Competition
Table	3	-	Difference	in	difference	estimates	I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent	Variable
Family	CEO -0.298*** -0.292*** -0.167*** -0.123***
(0.078) (0.093) (0.043) (0.030)
Log(Employment) 0.011 0.020** 0.024*** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Family	CEO*Log(Employment) 0.034***
(0.012)
Log(Sales) -0.001
(0.008)
Family	CEO*Log(Sales) 0.021**
(0.009)
Lerner	index 0.028
(0.017)
Family	CEO*Lerner	index 0.059**
(0.026)
Family	CEO*Import	Penetration	(OECD) 0.044**
(0.018)
R-squared 0.353 0.357 0.350 0.276
Number	of	firms 1,107 1,089 1,020 1,006
Country	by	Industry	dummies y y n n
Country	dummies n n y y
Industry	dummies n n y y
CEO	characteristics y y y y
Firm	characteristics	 y y y y
Noise	controls y y y y
Log(Hours	Worked)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS. In all columns robust standard errors
under coefficient clustered by 3 digits SIC codes. The variable "CEO Hours Worked" is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work
activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey week. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the
family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. All columns include country and industry dummis, as well as CEOand firm characteristics, and
noise controls. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes. CEO characteristics are a dummy to denote CEOs holding a managerial or board
position in another firm, the log of CEO age, the log of one plus number of years CEO has been employed in the firm, a dummy to denote
CEOs holding a college degree, a dummy to denote CEOs holding an MBA or equivalent degree, a dummy to denote CEO that have worked or
studied abroad. Firm characteristics are the log of one plus firm age, a dummy to denote foreign or domestic multinationals, the number of
people reporting directly to the CEO, a dummy to denote whether the firm employs a COO, the number of CEO's sons and daughters holding
a managerial position in the same firm. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote cases in which the time use data was recorded by the
CEO's Personal Assistant; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview
week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote weeks with a
national or religious holiday. Import penetration = Log(import/production) in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by averaging OECD STAN
data relative to the 2006–2008 time period (last available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level.
Lerner index of competition = (1-profit/sales) in the firm 3 digit SIC industry computed , as in Aghion et al. (2005), by averaging firm level data
in	ORBIS	relative	to	the	2008-2012	time	period	across	Brazil,	France,	Germany,	India,	US	and	UK		at	the	industry	level.
Notes: *si ficant at 10%; ** sig ificant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS. The va iable
”CEO Hours Worked” is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes
(excluding travel) during the survey week. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that
owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Lerner index of competition = (1-profit/sales) in the firm three digit SIC industry
computed, as in Aghion et al. (2005), by averaging firm level data in ORBIS relative to the 2008-2012 time period
across Br zil, France, Germany, India, US and UK at the ind stry level. Import penetration = l (impor /production)
in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by averaging OECD STAN data relative to the 2006–2008 time period
(last available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level (the linear term
is omitted as is perfectly collinear with two digits SIC dummies, also included as controls). All column include
country and industry dummies, as well as CEO and firm characteristics, and noise controls. Industry dummies are
33 two digits SIC codes. CEO characteristics are a dummy to denot CEOs holding a managerial or board position
in another firm, the log of CEO age, the log of one plus number of years CEO has been employed in the firm, a
dummy to denote CEOs holding a college degree, a dummy to denote CEOs holding an MBA or equivalent degree, a
dummy to denote CEO that have worked or studied abroad. Firm characteristics are the log of one plus firm age, a
dummy to denote foreign or domestic multinationals, the number of people reporting directly to the CEO, a dummy
to denote whether the firm employs a COO, the number of CEO’s sons and daughters holding a managerial position
in the same firm. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote cases in which the time use data was recorded by the
CEO’s Personal Assistant; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive
Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the
week and a dummy to denote weeks with a national or religious holiday. Robust standard errors in columns 1 and
2. Standard errors are clustered at the three digit SIC level in column 3, and at the ISIC REV3 industry level in
column 4.
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data was collected, as well as for previous months. We classify a day as having extreme rain if its
deviation from the driest month in the year preceding the survey (May 2011 in India and July 2012
in Brazil) falls in the upper third of the station level distribution of the same variable. By this
measure, 403 CEOs out of 597 CEOs (or 67% of the sample) experience extreme rain at least once
during the survey week.31
The second quasi-natural experiment we exploit is the happening of important sport matches,
cricket in India and soccer in Brazil. These sports are extremely popular in these countries, and
the cost of e↵ort is likely to be higher during a match for an average individual, including CEOs.
For this test, we take advantage of the fact that our data collection partially overlapped with key
events: the playo↵s, semifinals and finals of a major cricket tournament, the Indian Premier League
(IPL), in India; and popular soccer matches played by top teams in the 2013 State Football League
in Brazil.32 For both countries, we collect data on the timing of these matches and classify a day
to have a sport event if one is scheduled on the day. Since only 100 CEOs across the two countries
are exposed to at least one match during the survey week, this test will inherently have less power
than the earlier test to identify CEOs’ responses.
For this analysis, we use total hours of work at the daily level (since this is the frequency at
which the shocks occur) to estimate the following specification:
hid = ↵
FFami +  Xd +  Fami ⇤Xd + Ci⇢+ Fi'+ Si  + Ii⌘ + "id (6)
where hid is one plus the log of daily hours worked by CEO i on day d, Fami = 1 if CEO i belongs
to the owning family as defined above, Xd = 1 if day d has extreme rainfall in Columns 1-4 and a
sport match in Columns 5-8 and C,F, S, I are vectors of CEO, firm, and industry characteristics as
defined in equation 4; standard errors are clustered at the firm and date level across all regressions.
The coe cient of interest is  , the parameter measuring whether family and professional CEOs
react di↵erently to shocks increasing the marginal cost of e↵ort.
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 6. Column 1 restricts the sample to Indian
firms, and replicates our baseline specification controlling for the extreme rain dummy. The di↵er-
ence in hours worked between family and professional CEOs is in line with earlier estimates (8%),
31See the Appendix for details on the construction of the rain shock variable.
32In Brazil, since the data collection did not overlap with finals or semi-finals we focus on matches played by the
top 30 teams (as measured by fanbase size). See the Appendix for details.
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while the coe cient on extreme rain is negative, but not significant. In column 2 we include the
interaction family CEO*rain. This shows that family CEOs reduce their hours on a rainy day
significantly more than professional CEOs (coe cient -0.066, standard error 0.030). Columns 3
and 4 show that also in Brazil family CEOs are much more likely to react to rain shocks relative to
professional CEOs. The coe cient is also negative and significant at the 10% level, with a similar
magnitude (coe cient -0.071, standard error 0.041). The results are similar when we pool the
sample across the two countries (see column 1 in Appendix Table A.10). 33
According to the model, the di↵erential reaction to common shocks identifies the sign of the
di↵erence in preferences if and only if the cost shock (rain) a↵ects all CEOs equally regardless
of firm governance. This assumption fails if factors correlated with firm governance type a↵ect
the e↵ect of rain shocks on the marginal cost or the marginal product of CEO time, namely
cov("id,Fami ⇤Raind) 6= 0. For example, firms run by family CEOs might have characteristics that
make them more prone to be disrupted by rain (e.g., if they are more likely to have old machinery
or bad maintenance processes). To test the robustness of the results to these factors, in Appendix
Table A.10 we augment the specification with additional CEO and firms controls and interactions
between rain and state, and between industry, CEO and firm characteristics. Reassuringly, the
inclusion of these interactions does not generally a↵ect the magnitude and precision of the di↵erence
in di↵erence estimate allaying the concern that this captured unobservables at the firm day level.34
We turn to sport events in columns 5 to 8. Since the sport matches we consider are generally
held in the evenings, we focus on the afternoon hours (after 1pm in India and after 3pm in Brazil),
which we expect to be more a↵ected by the shocks. Even in this case, family CEOs are more likely
to reduce their hours in concomitance of sport events relative to days with no sport event, in both
India and Brazil. This reduction is also larger relative to professional CEOs, who appear to be
una↵ected by the “shock”–the   coe cients is, respectively -0.141 and -0.276, both significant at
the 5%. Appendix Table A.11 allows for a rich set of interactions between sport events and CEO,
firm, industry and state characteristics. The magnitude of the   coe cient is generally stable across
33We checked in more detail whether this result was driven by professional CEOs increasing their hours during
rainy days, rather than family CEOs reducing their hours. The results are driven entirely by family CEOs working
fewer hours while professional CEOs hours worked remain stable on a rainy day.
34Across the experiments, the   coe cient retains a similar magnitude but turns insignificant when we include the
set of CEO characteristics interacted with the rain dummy.
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these more flexible specifications.35
Mechanisms
Taken together, the results in this section are consistent with the idea that the leisure-performance
tradeo↵ di↵ers between family and professional CEOs or, in the terminology of our model, cP>cF .
While our data does not allow us to fully investigate the reasons behind the heterogeneity in the
preference for leisure across CEOs, a candidate explanation consistent with our results is that these
di↵erences may be related to wealth di↵erentials. Namely, family CEOs are likely to be wealthier
than professional CEOs, since they own the firms they lead. If leisure is a normal good, this would
result in di↵erences in the leisure-performance tradeo↵ across CEOs.
To investigate this idea, we examine whether the di↵erences in the hours worked by family
CEOs vary according to cross-country di↵erences in inheritance laws–the results of this analysis are
presented and discussed in Appendix Table A.12. These laws are interesting from our perspective,
since they create variation in wealth concentration (Ellul et al. (2010)), such that more permissive
laws favor the concentration of wealth in the hands of the individual designated to inherit the control
of the family business. Other things equal, we therefore expect family CEOs to be wealthier in
countries where the maximal share of transmissible wealth is larger, and the di↵erence between
family and professional CEOs to be larger.
In line with this hypothesis, we find that the di↵erence in hours worked between family and
professional CEOs is increasing in the share of wealth that can be bequeathed to a single heir.
To the extent that wealth concentration is correlated with wealth di↵erentials between owners and
managers, the result provides some indicative evidence that labor supply di↵erences may be a↵ected
by wealth di↵erences.
Another observationally equivalent explanation is that family and professional CEOs have simi-
lar preferences for leisure, but are subject to di↵erent performance-related incentives. For example,
the compensation of family CEOs may be less sensitive to firm performance, or they may attribute
a lower probability to the event of being fired for underperformance.
In absence of detailed data on CEO wealth and or firm level incentive policies, we cannot distin-
guish between these two alternative channels. We note, however, that both mechanisms–combined
35Similar to the rain regressions, across the experiments, the   coe cient retains a similar magnitude but turns
insignificant when we include the set of CEO characteristics interacted with the rain dummy.
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with the productivity results presented in Table 2–imply that potential profit opportunities may
be lost in the pursuit of private benefits of control.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows a significant di↵erence in labor supply of between family and professional CEOs:
family CEOs tend to work fewer hours. This di↵erence between is not entirely accounted for by
observable di↵erences in firm, CEO and industry characteristics, and is larger when the opportunity
cost of leisure is smaller. These patterns are consistent with the predictions of a simple model with
heterogeneous preferences for leisure between family and professional CEOs. The data also reveals
a strong correlation between CEO hours and firm performance. While no causal inference can
be made, di↵erences in hours worked can account for almost a fifth of the productivity di↵erence
between family and professional CEOs. The behavioral di↵erence is hence a potential candidate
to account for at least some of the performance di↵erential between family and non-family firms
documented in the literature (Morck et al. (1998), Villalonga and Amit (2006b), Pe´rez-Gonza´lez
(2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007), Bertrand et al. (2008), Bertrand (2009)).
The question that follows naturally is: why don’t family CEOs delegate to professionals who are
willing to work longer hours, so to enjoy both more leisure and higher profits? One possibility is that
family CEOs are unable to delegate due to costly contract enforcement and the subsequent perceived
risk of expropriation on the part of non-family a liated CEOs (Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)). As
documented in the earlier literature (Burkart et al. (2003), Durnev and Kim (2005), Doidge et al.
(2007)), this hypothesis is consistent with observed cross country di↵erences in family controlled
firms. Consistently with these findings, we find that the share of family CEOs is significantly higher
in developing countries, where governance is typically more problematic.
The evidence presented in this paper highlights the importance of a previously unexplored
dimension of heterogeneity across managers, that is, their e↵ort on the job. The observed di↵erences
in managerial e↵ort between family and professional CEOs raise a public finance question: would
policies aimed at reducing intra-family transfers of businesses bring about an increase in productive
e ciency? Such policies might include an inheritance tax, a wealth tax, or a reduction in the various
forms of exemptions that family firms enjoy in many parts of the worldTsoutsoura (2015). We leave
these questions for future work.
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Appendix Tables and Figures - Not for Publication
A Data Appendix
A.1 The Time Use Survey
A.1.1 Survey Management
The time use survey took place in two stages, both led by the same project manager: in the Spring
of 2011 a team of fifteen enumerators and two supervisors based in Mumbai collected data on
India, while the rest of the countries were covered in a second survey wave in the Spring of 2013
by a team of forty enumerators and six supervisors based at the London School of Economics.
To ensure comparability, we adopted the same protocol and retained the same project manager
across both waves. The enumerators were typically graduate students (often MBAs) recruited
specifically for this project. All enumerators were subject to a common intensive training on the
survey methodology for three days at the beginning of the project, plus weekly team progress
reviews and one to one conversations with their supervisors to discuss possible uncertainties with
respect to the classification of the time use data. Each interview was checked o↵ at the end of the
week by a supervisor, who would make sure that the data was complete in every field, and that the
enumerator had codified all the activities according to the survey protocol. Each enumerator ran
on average thirty interviews, with an average of three interviews per week to ensure data quality.
Each enumerator was allocated a random list of about 120 companies, was in charge of calling
up the numbers of his or her list to convince the CEO to participate in the survey, and collecting
the time use data in the week allocated to the CEO.
We actively monitored and coached the enumerators throughout the project, which intensified
their persistence in chasing the CEOs and getting them to participate. We also o↵ered the CEOs
a personalized analysis of their use of time (which was sent to them in January 2012 to the Indian
CEOs and in June 2014 to the rest of the countries) to give them the ability to monitor their time
allocation, and compare it with peers in the industry.
A.1.2 Sampling Frame
The sampling frame was randomly drawn from ORBIS, an extensive commercial data set that
contains company accounts for several millions of companies around the world. Our sampling
criteria were as follows. First, we restricted the sample to manufacturing and additionally kept
firms that were classified as “active” in the year prior to the survey (2010 in India and 2012 for the
other countries) and with available recent accounting data.36These conditions restricted our sample
to 11,500 firms. Second, we further restricted the sample to companies for which we could find
CEOs contact details. To gather contact information we hired a team of research assistants based
in Mumbai, London and Boston who verified the CEOs names and found their phone numbers and
emails. This restricted the sample to 7,744 firms. Of these, 907 later resulted not to be eligible
for the interviews upon the first telephonic contact (the reasons for non eligibility included recent
36For the Indian sample, we also restricted the sample to firms headquartered in the fifteen main Indian states.
This excluded firms located in Assam, Bihar, Chandigarh, Chhattisgarh, Dadra, Daman and Diu, Goa, Himachal
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Orissa and Uttarakhand, each of which accounts for less than 3% of
Indian GDP.
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Figure A.1: Survey InstrumentFigure'A1'*'Survey'screenshot
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Table A.1: Selection AnalysisTable&A1&)&&Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All All All
Dependent&Variable
Country=Brazil 0.677*** 0.695*** 0.655*** 0.559*
(0.074) (0.075) (0.079) (0.288)
Country=France 0.210*** 0.256*** 0.143 0.562**
(0.073) (0.074) (0.104) (0.221)
Country=Germany 0.115 0.194** 0.152* 0.476**
(0.072) (0.078) (0.082) (0.222)
Country=India 0.658*** 0.699** 1.227*** 0.672
(0.247) (0.272) (0.371) (0.425)
Country=UK /0.178** /0.139* /0.153** 0.088
(0.074) (0.074) (0.077) (0.218)
Log(Sales) /0.071***
(0.011)
Log(Sales/Employees) /0.018
(0.030)
ROCE 0.000
(0.001)
Number&of&firms 6256 5993 4090 3492
Dummy=1&if&CEO&participated
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by probit (marginal
effects reported, robust standard errors under coefficient). The dependent variable in all columns is a dummy=1 if
the CEO participated in the survey. The selection regression is run on the latest available year of accounting data.
AllOcolumnsOincludeO2OdigitsOSICOindustryOdummies.
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by probit (marginal
e↵ects reported, robust standard errors under coe cient). The dependent variable in all columns is a dummy=1 if
the CEO participated in the survey. The selection regression is run on the latest available year of accounting data.
All columns include 2 digits SIC industry dummies.
bankruptcy or the company not being in manufacturing), and 310 were never contacted because
the project ended before this was possible. The final number of eligible companies was thus 6,527,
with median yearly sales of $53,000,000. Of these, we were able to secure an interview with 1,131
CEOs, although 17 CEOs dropped out before the end of the data collection week and were thus
removed from the sample before the analysis was conducted.
The selection analysis in Table A.1 shows that firms in the final sample have on average slightly
lower log sales relative to the sampling frame (coe cient 0.071, standard error 0.011). However,
we do not find any significant selection e↵ect on performance variables, such as labor productivity
(sales over employees) and return on capital employed (ROCE).
A.2 Firm Data
A.2.1 Accounts
Accounting data were all drawn from ORBIS for all countries. The main exception is India, where
employment figures are typically not published in the public accounts. Therefore, we gathered this
information from the survey questionnaire.
In the regressions shown in Table 2 we restrict the sample to the three most recent years in the
interval running from 2007 to 2011 in India and 2008 to 2012 for the rest of the sample, and use
only years in which the CEO was in o ce. The summary statistics for this sample are shown in
Table A.2.
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Table A.2: Accounting Data: Summary Statistics
Table&A8&)&Accounting&Data&)&Summary&Statistics
Mean Standard&
Deviation
Number&of&firms&
with&available&
information
Number&of&Employees 1764.67 9287.85 617
Sales 336642.30 2076857.00 617
Capital 78335.56 466065.10 617
Profits&per&Employee 10.06 16.43 720
Tobin's&Q 1.06 1.11 313
Investment 12150.15 73855.30 697
Wages 57256.50 476536.40 563
Notes: All data drawn from ORBIS, averages across the 3 years of accounting data used
in Table X (only years in which the CEO was in office are included). All variables
expressedQinQUS$.QAccountingQdataQrunQbetweenQ2007QandQ2013.
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of the accounting data used in Table 2 and A.4. All data
is expressed in real 2005 ’000 US$, except for Tobin’s Q.
A.2.2 Ownership
Ownership data is collected in interviews with the CEOs and independently checked using several
Internet sources (e.g. The Economic Times of India, Bloomberg, etc.), information provided on
the company website and supplemental phone interviews. We define a firm to be owned by an
entity if this controls more than 25.01% of the shares; if no single entity owns at least 25.01% of
the share the firm is labeled as “Dispersed shareholder”. Family firms are defined as those where
a family (combined across all family members, all second generation relative to the founder or
beyond) are the largest shareholders. Founder firms are defined as those where the original founder
of the company is the largest shareholder. For both family 2nd generation and founder firms, we
distinguish between cases in which a family firm or the founder are also CEOs of the company, in
contrast to cases in which a professional manager (i.e. a person not a liated with the founder or
the family) has been nominated CEO. In the analysis we combine founder CEO and family, 2nd
generation CEOs in a single category (41% of the sample). The omitted category in all regressions
includes family or founder owned firms with professional CEOs (16.2%), dispersed shareholders
(22.5%), government (0.8%), private equity/venture capital (7.5%), private individuals who are
not founders or heirs to the founders of the company (9.3%). In 2.7% of the sample, the firm was
owned by joint venture with equal split of the ownership shares.
A.3 Industry Data
Our industry classification is the US SIC (1987). Each firm is allocated to each main two digit
sector based on sales. We have 32 distinct two digit industries, and at least two companies for all
of these industries except 4 (0.4% of the sample of firms).
The Lerner index of competition is constructed following Aghion et al. (2005) as the mean of
(1-profit/sales) in the entire database excluding the firm itself for every three digit SIC industry,
using accounting data relative to the six countries in our sample (data averaged between 2006 and
2010 for India and between 2008 and 2012 for the rest of the countries).
The import competition measure is built as real industry imports divided by industry sales,
using STAN data produced by the OECD. The measure is obtained by taking averages across all
countries in our sample for which the industry measures were available (France, Germany, UK and
42
US). The years used to build this measures are 2006 to 2008, i.e. the latest years for which the
data was produced using the ISIC REV3 classification (the coverage of the countries included in
our sample declines dramatically in the data produced using the ISIC REV4 classification).
A.4 Shocks
A.4.1 Rain Shocks
The climate data was extracted on 12/08/2011 from http://www7.ncdc.noaa.gov/CDO/cdodata.cmd.
The data was merged with station coordinates (latitude and longitude), and these were in turn used
to merge the data with the time use dataset using the date and zipcode of each of the activities
recorded in the data (data matched with the closest station, distance computed by generating the
vertical and horizontal distance using the latitude and longitude points and applying Pythagoras).
In India, the expected arrival of the Monsoons is around June 1st, starting from the southwestern
coast of Kerala, and gradually covering the entirety of India by July 15th. Therefore, for the
Indian sample the definition of days of intense rain is based on the comparison of the daily rainfall
precipitation with the average precipitation in the pre-Monsoon month of May for the same station.
We first compute a variable measuring for each day between June 1st and July 31st the change in
precipitation relative to the average May values for the same station. We then define a variable
“Extreme Rain” which takes value one if the change in rainfall lies in the third tercile of the overall
distribution computed using data across all stations in the sample. Finally, we match the CEO time
use information with the rainfall data of the closest weather station by using the modal (manually
collected) zip code of the activities undertaken by the CEO during the week. We use the same
approach in Brazil, but in this case we use as a reference the month of July of the year prior to
the survey (2012), which is on average the driest month for the Sa˜o Paulo region,37 where 44.4%
of the firms in the Brazilian sample are located.
The rainfall measure can be constructed for 597 CEOs in the sample. 32% of the CEO-day
observations are classified as days of intense rain. 403 CEOs out of 597 CEOs (of which 215
family and 188 professional CEOs) experience extreme rain at least once during the survey week.
363 CEOs in the sample (186 family CEOs and 177 professional CEOs) have at least one day of
extreme rain and one day of non-extreme rain during the sample week.
A.4.2 Sport Events
For the Indian sample, we use data on the 2011 Indian Premier League (IPL) Cricket tournament.
We focus on four games: two playo↵s (Royal Challengers vs. Chennai Super Kings, played on
5/25/2011) and Mumbai Indians vs. Kolkata Knight Riders, played on 5/25/2011), one semi-final
for the 3rd and 4th place (Royal Challengers vs. Mumbai Indians, played on 5/27/2011) and the
final (Chennai Super Kings vs. Royal Challengers (played on 5/28/2011). For the Brazilian sample,
we use data on soccer matches played in the 2013 State Football Leagues. We focus on matched
played by the top 30 teams (as measured by fanbase size).38 These teams are located in the states
of Bahia, Ceara´, Goia´s, Minas Gerais, Para´, Parana´, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do
37https://weather-and-climate.com/average-monthly-Rainfall-Temperature-Sunshine,sao-paulo,Brazil
38The source for the soccer match data is Resultados.com (http://www.resultados.com/futebol/brasil/). The source
for fanbase data is a survey conducted by Pluri Stochos Pesquisas e Licenciamento Esportivo between November 2012
and February 2013. A total of 21,049 people were interviewed.
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Sul, Santa Catarina, and Sa˜o Paulo. The State Football League matches started in January and
ended in May 2013, which coincided with the timing of our data collection.
The sport events dummy is constructed for 597 CEOs, 6% of the CEO-day observation are
classified as days with a sport event. 100 CEOs out of 597 CEOs (of which 46 family and 54
professional CEOs) experience a day with a sport event and a day without a sport event during
the survey week.
A.5 Wealth and the Demand for Leisure
While it is intuitive that the average family CEO, who owns a sizable share of the firm, may
be wealthier than the average professional CEOs, who owns a small share of the firm (if any),
a test of the hypothesis requires comparing the di↵erence in hours worked at di↵erent levels of
wealth di↵erentials. Measuring personal wealth via surveys is notoriously di cult and we have no
information, let alone a plausible source of variation, on the CEOs’ wealth.
Instead, we approach this question using as a proxy for wealth di↵erentials between family and
professional CEOs exploiting cross-country di↵erences in inheritance laws compiled by Ellul et al.
(2010), which provide a country-specific measure of the largest share of the family wealth that can
be bequeathed to a single heir. Intuitively, more permissive laws favor the concentration of wealth
in the hands of the individual designated to inherit the control of the family business. Other things
equal, we therefore expect family CEOs to be wealthier in countries where the maximal share of
transmissible wealth is larger.
The variable “Max % of inheritable wealth” used in Table A.12 measures the largest share of the
estate that in each country a testator can bequeath to a single child in presence of a surviving spouse
and two siblings (Ellul et al show that the median number of children of firm owners is estimated to
be two across almost all countries where this could be calculated). We use the measure published
on Table 1, column 4 of the paper for all countries except for India. The measure proposed for
India by Ellul et al is based on the Indian Succession Act, which applies to all non Hindu and
non Muslim citizens. Since the vast majority (81%) of the Indian family firms in our sample are
organized as Hindu United Family (HUF) organizations, we refer instead to the Hindu Succession
Act (1956) which stipulates that the head of a HUF family firm must bequeath his share of the
firm in equal parts to all members of the HUF. Since there must be at least two members in a
HUF and we do not know the number of family members, we take 0.5 to be the upper bound of
the inheritance share. Results are robust to assuming there are three surviving members hence the
maximal share is 0.33.
To test whether this results in larger di↵erences in hours worked between family and professional
CEOs we estimate:
hijc = ↵Fami +  Fami ⇤ (Sc   S¯) + Ci'+ Fi +  j + ⌘c + "ijc (A.1)
where Sc is the largest admissible inheritance share in country c and S¯ is the sample mean.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level and bootstrapped using the wild bootstrapping
technique proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) given the small number of clusters. The coe cient of
interest is  , the interaction between the family CEO dummy and the inheritance share variable.
Under the assumption that the latter proxies for family CEOs wealth, the hypothesis that the
demand for leisure is increasing in wealth implies   < 0. We scale Sc in deviation from its sample
mean, so that the coe cient on the family CEO dummy ↵ measures the di↵erence between family
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and professional CEOs at the mean values of Sc. Sc ranges from .5 (France and India) to 1 (UK
and US).
Column 1, Table A.12 reports the estimates of (A.1). We find   < 0 and precisely estimated.
Its magnitude implies that going from an average share of .69 to the highest share of 1 increases
the di↵erence in hours worked by .07 log points, 79% of the mean e↵ect. In other words, family
CEOs located in countries with the average level of the inheritance variable work 9% fewer hours
than professional CEOs; those in countries with the highest level of the inheritance variable work
16% fewer hours than professional CEOs.
The inheritance variable may capture other country specific factors di↵erent from wealth con-
centration, which may also a↵ect the labor supply of family CEOs. For example, di↵erences in the
quality of contract enforcement may a↵ect the ability to delegate control to a professional CEO
(Bloom et al. (2013)) and, therefore, the selection of family CEOs (intuitively, when delegation is
feasible all family CEOs who have a higher marginal utility of leisure should delegate to hard work-
ing professionals and enjoy the extra profits these generate, while the only family CEOs who choose
not to delegate should work as hard as professional CEOs). In Columns 2-5 of Table A.12 we check
the robustness of the results to estimate (A.1) using di↵erent proxies of contract enforcement in lieu
of S. Column 2 uses regional GDP, a country specific measure of the level of development (Gennaioli
et al. (2013)), which is presumably correlated with the quality of contractual enforcement. Column
3 uses cross-country di↵erences in the rule of law and Column 4 uses regional variation in the level
of generalized trust, which we take as a proxy for the ease to manage incomplete contracts (Bloom
et al. (2012)).39 As above, we scale these variables in deviation from their sample means.
None of the interactions with these country-specific measures are significant. Finally, Column 5
includes together all the interactions between the family CEO dummy and all the proxies of contract
enforcement, plus the interaction with the inheritance law variable discussed in the previous section.
The latter remains of a similar magnitude and statistically significant at the 10% level.
A.6 Additional Tables Referenced in the Text
39The Rule of Law measure captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in
units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. and is drawn from Kaufmann
et al. (2010). Data on regional GDP per capita is drawn from Gennaioli et al. (2013). The measure is expressed in
PPP constant 2005 international dollars. Data on regional trust has been calculated from the World Values Survey
(WVS). The WVS is a cross-country project coordinated by the Institute for Social Research of the University of
Michigan. Each wave carries out representative surveys of the basic values and beliefs of individuals in a large cross-
section of countries. The questionnaire contains answers to specific questions about religion and social attitudes,
including several question on generalized and specific trust (e.g. trust in the family, government etc.), as well as
detailed information on the social and education background of the respondents (age, income, and education). The
key question we use is the standard one: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. The WVS data can be downloaded from the WVS website
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org). For the purposes of our analysis, we pool together four successive waves of data
collection (1981–1984, 1989–1993, 1994–1999 and 1999–2004), and we use only individual entries with information
on the respondents’ region of residence. We compute the regional level of trust by taking the simple average over all
observations available for the region across all WVS waves (see Bloom et al. (2012) for further details).
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics - Country LevelTable&A3&)&Summary&Statistics&by&Country&(means)
Brazil France Germany India UK US Total
Panel&A.&Time&use
Total&weekly&hours&worked&)&recall&measure 50.26 50.81 52.11 n.a.. 52.08 54.97 51.72
Total&weekly&hours&worked&)&diary&measure 52.60 58.30 55.88 46.27 54.40 55.09 52.01
Total&weekly&hours&worked&excluding&activities&<&15&mins,&personal& &travel 40.80 47.02 46.69 35.94 44.31 45.41 41.44
Number&of&days&at&work 5.29 5.21 5.54 5.25 5.52 5.61 5.36
Beginning&of&work&day&(hour) 8.51 8.19 8.58 9.80 8.45 8.03 8.83
End&of&work&day&(hours) 18.13 18.92 18.19 18.57 17.89 17.60 18.27
Share&of&time&spent&in&personal&activities 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.10
Panel&B.&CEO&characteristics
Age 51.90 49.53 49.26 50.61 49.02 53.47 50.93
Male 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.94 0.93 0.96
College&degree 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.84 0.91 0.92
MBA 0.63 0.60 0.85 0.41 0.47 0.48 0.55
Tenure&as&CEO& 11.39 7.12 7.85 12.82 7.00 8.57 10.30
Tenure&in&firm 19.34 12.29 14.98 19.11 14.16 15.29 17.12
Experience&abroad 0.55 0.56 0.69 0.33 0.59 0.42 0.48
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms 0.34 0.35 0.58 0.47 0.40 0.38 0.42
Panel&C.&Firm&Characteristics
Domestic&or&Foreign&Multinational 0.17 0.24 0.48 0.17 0.32 0.32 0.24
Number&of&Employees 1185.64 730.21 4942.14 1224.86 486.78 1559.61 1571.05
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 6.60 8.54 9.50 7.79 7.93 7.85 7.77
COO 0.19 0.19 0.42 0.05 0.74 0.54 0.26
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.10
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.04
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant 0.56 0.40 0.58 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.43
%&of&Family&Firms 0.41 0.14 0.31 0.67 0.17 0.21 0.41
Panel&D.&Industry&Characteristics
Lerner&Index 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.34 1.16 1.16 1.23
Import&Penetration 0.63 0.56 0.66 0.66 0.48 0.58 0.61
ln(GDP&per&Capita),&region 9.22 10.30 10.36 8.03 10.39 10.65 9.36
Rule&of&Law,&country .0.29 1.41 1.64 0.09 1.67 1.55 0.62
Trust,&region 0.06 0.22 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.42 0.28
Max&%&Inheritance,&country 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.68
Notes: The table shows summary statistics (means, standard deviation in parentheses in columns 1.3; differences and t.statistic in parentheses in column 4) of CEO time
use, CEO characteristics, firm and industry level data for a sample of 1114 CEOs in Brazil (N=282), France (N=115), Germany (N=125), India (N=356), UK (N=87) and US
(N=149). All variables in Panel A, B and C collected in the CEO time use survey. Import penetration = ln(import/production) in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by
averaging OECD STAN data relative to the 2006–2008 time period (last available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level. Lerner
index of competition = (1.profit/sales) in the firm 3 digit SIC industry computed , as in Aghion et al. (2005), by averaging firm level data in ORBIS relative to the 2008.2012
time^period^across^Brazil,^France,^Germany,^India,^US^and^UK^^at^the^industry^level.
Not s: T e table hows summary statistics (m ans, standard deviation in parentheses in columns 1-3; di↵erences and
t-statistic in parentheses in column 4) of CEO time use, CEO characteristics, firm and industry level data for a sample
of 1114 CEOs in Brazil (N=282), France (N=115), Germany (N=125), India (N=356), UK (N=87) and US (N=149).
All variables in Panel A, B and C collected in the CEO time use survey. Import penetration = ln(import/production)
in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by averaging OECD STAN data relative to the 2006–2008 time period
(last available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level. Lerner index of
competition = (1-profit/sales) in the firm 3 digit SIC industry computed, as in Aghion et al. (2005), by averaging
firm level data in ORBIS relative to the 2008-2012 time period across Brazil, France, Germany, India, US and UK at
the industry level.
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Table A.4: CEO hours worked and firm inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent-variable
Family-CEO !0.779*** !0.671*** !0.446*** !0.387***
(0.233) (0.247) (0.128) (0.133)
Log(Hours-worked) 0.902* 0.675**
(0.507) (0.307)
Log(Employment) 0.878*** 0.852*** 0.925*** 0.905***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.045) (0.047)
Log(Capital)
Observations 697 697 1735 1735
Number-of-firms 404 404 563 563
Log(Investments) Log(Wages)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (standard
errors under coe cient clustered by firm). The variable ”CEO Hours Worked” is the log of the total hours the CEO
devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey week. The dependent
variable in columns 1 and 2 is log investments; in columns 3 and 4, log average wages.. Accounting data run between
2007 and 2013. Each column includes a full set of country by 2 digits SIC and year dummies. We include only years
in which the CEO was in o ce in all columns, and allow for a maximum of three years of accounts for each firm
(3 most recent years with non missing data in ORBIS). All columns include the following noise controls include: a
dummy to denote case in which the time use data was recorded by the CEO’s Personal Assistant; 55 interviewer
dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a
self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote weeks with
a national or religious holiday.
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Table A.5: Pre-Appointment Trends
Table&R3&)&Pre&appointment&trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5)
Dependent&Variable Profits&per&Employee
Log(Employment) 0.740*** 0.745*** '4.822 '4.252
(0.107) (0.116) (3.802) (4.348)
Log(Capital) 0.117*** 0.117** '0.263*** '0.302**
(0.040) (0.046) (0.092) (0.129)
Trend 0.046 0.040 '6.232* '8.052* 0.007 '0.012
(0.128) (0.141) (3.392) (4.829) (0.027) (0.045)
Trend*Family&CEO '0.009 '0.006 0.661 0.431 '0.015 0.010
(0.018) (0.019) (0.978) (1.027) (0.040) (0.052)
Trend*Professional&CEO&replacing&a&family&CEO 0.024 '0.676 0.032
(0.031) (1.148) (0.067)
R)squared 0.985 0.984 0.644 0.620 0.628 0.698
Observations 953 738 898 693 1616 971
Number&of&firms 271 208 266 198 381 206
Firm&fixed&effects& y y y y y y
Log(Sales) ROA
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (standard errors under coefficient
clustered by firm). The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is log sales in the years preceding the CEO appointment, up to 5 years before
appointment. The dependent variables in columns 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 are, respectively, profits per employee and ROA (profits/capital), for
the same time period as in columns 1 and 2. All columns include year dummies and firm fixed effects. Family CEO=1 for those who own the
firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Family Ownership, External CEO=1 for professional CEOs working in firms
ownedWbyWaWfamily,WandW0Wotherwise.
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (standard errors
under coe cient clustered by firm). The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is log sales in the years preceding
the CEO appointment, up to 5 years before appointment. In columns 3 a d 4, and 5 and 6, respectively, it is profits
per employee and ROA, for the same time period. All columns include year dummies and firm fixed e↵ects. Family
CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Family Ownership,
External CEO=1 for professional CEOs working in firms owned by a family, and 0 otherwise.
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Table A.6: Robustness ChecksTable&A4&)&Family&vs.&Professional&CEOs&)&Additional&Robustness&Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experiment Baseline Levels Negative&
binomial
Restrincting&
sample&to&Brazil&
&&India
Restricting&sample&
to&France,&
Germany,&UK&and&
US
First&survey&wave&
(India&only)
Second&survey&
wave&(Brazil,&
France,&Germany,&
UK&and&US)
Dependent&Variable Log(Hours&
Worked)
Hours&Worked Hours&Worked Log(Hours&
Worked)
Log(Hours&
Worked)
Log(Hours&
Worked)
Log(Hours&
Worked)
Family&CEO !0.088*** !3.104*** !0.080*** !0.079*** !0.095** !0.065** !0.098***
(0.020) (0.776) (0.017) (0.022) (0.039) (0.031) (0.026)
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms 0.014 0.347 0.011 0.023 0.005 0.044* 0.005
(0.015) (0.571) (0.013) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.019)
Log(CEO&age) !0.143*** !5.180*** !0.135*** !0.138*** !0.171** !0.172** !0.134**
(0.045) (1.785) (0.039) (0.053) (0.082) (0.069) (0.059)
Log(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) !0.006 !0.121 !0.002 !0.001 0.002 !0.004 !0.003
(0.011) (0.409) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013)
CEO&holds&College&degree 0.054* 2.300** 0.058** 0.048 0.007 0.061 0.046
(0.033) (1.135) (0.026) (0.039) (0.052) (0.050) (0.039)
CEO&holds&MBA&degree 0.006 0.358 0.008 !0.018 0.031 0.012 0.006
(0.018) (0.666) (0.015) (0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023)
CEO&has&study/work&experience&abroad !0.003 0.024 0.003 0.014 !0.031 !0.017 !0.000
(0.017) (0.626) (0.014) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.021)
Log(Employment) 0.024*** 0.930*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.015 0.027*** 0.022**
(0.007) (0.282) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Log(Firm&age) 0.003 0.055 0.002 0.002 !0.002 !0.026 0.011
(0.011) (0.418) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.012)
MNE 0.033* 1.251* 0.029* 0.041 0.039 0.071* 0.016
(0.019) (0.755) (0.016) (0.026) (0.031) (0.037) (0.024)
Listed& !0.009 !0.400 !0.013 0.056 !0.056* 0.038 !0.016
(0.024) (1.000) (0.020) (0.035) (0.032) (0.084) (0.026)
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 0.006*** 0.258** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.002 0.009** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.102) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
COO&exists !0.018 !0.637 !0.014 !0.042 0.013 !0.019 !0.014
(0.020) (0.784) (0.016) (0.029) (0.027) (0.055) (0.021)
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions !0.060*** !2.022*** !0.058*** !0.057** !0.160*** !0.023 !0.179***
(0.021) (0.726) (0.018) (0.023) (0.061) (0.024) (0.046)
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions !0.013 !0.863 !0.018 !0.031 0.038 !0.040 0.029
(0.029) (1.044) (0.025) (0.032) (0.071) (0.039) (0.041)
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant !0.001 !0.096 !0.003 !0.009 0.014 0.009 !0.004
(0.017) (0.652) (0.014) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.021)
R)squared 0.347 0.360 0.351 0.163 0.249 0.268
Number&of&firms 1,114 1,114 1,114 638 476 356 758
Country&by&Industry&dummies y y y y y y y
Noise&controls y y y y y y y
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust standard errors in parenthesis), except for column 3, estimated using a
negative binomial regression. The dependent variable is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the
survey week in columns 1 and 4!6, while the level of hours worked is used incolumns 2 and 3. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm,
and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was recorded by the PA; 55 interviewer dummies;
a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the
weekUandUaUdummyUtoUdenoteUweeksUwithUaUnationalUorUreligiousUholiday.
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust
standard rrors in parenthesis), except for colum 3, estimated using a n gative binomial regression. The dependent
variable is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding
travel) during the survey week in columns 1 and 4-6, while the level of hours worked is used in columns 2 and 3.
Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Industry
dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was recorded
by the PA; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29
interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a
dummy to denote weeks with a national or religious holiday.
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Table A.7: Additional Results Using Firm Sales and Capital as Controls
Table&R2&)&Additional&results&using&Sales&and&Capital&as&Proxies&for&firm&size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent&Variable
Family&CEO !0.084*** !0.085*** !0.079*** !0.079*** !0.079*** !0.076*** !0.076*** !0.072***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Log(Employment) 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.018** 0.025*** 0.015*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Sales&1&Year&Growth&Rates 0.037
(0.048)
Sales&3&Year&Growth&Rates 0.029
(0.019)
Log(Sales) 0.010*
(0.006)
Log(Capital) 0.012***
(0.005)
R)squared 0.349 0.349 0.402 0.403 0.349 0.351 0.372 0.376
Number&of&firms 876 876 700 700 1076 1076 890 890
Log(Hours&Worked)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust standard errors in parenthesis). The
variable "Hours Worked" is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during
the survey week. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. The variables Sales 1 Year
and Sales 3 Years measure, respectively, the average log 1 and 3 years growth rate of sales, in all available years preceding the survey. Log(Sales)
and Log(Capital) measure the average log of these variables in levels, averaged across all available years preceding the survey. All columns include
the same set of controls used in Table 4, column 6. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if
the time use data was recorded by the PA; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29
interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote weeks with a
national[or[religious[holiday.
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust
standard errors in parenthesis). The variable ”Hours Worked” is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work
activities lasting ore than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey week. Family CEO=1 for those who own
the firm or belong to t family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwi e. The vari bles Sales 1 Year and Sale 3 Years
measure, respectively, the average log 1 and 3 years growth rate of sales, in all available years preceding the survey.
Log(Sales) and Log(Capital) measure the average log of these variables in levels, averaged across all available years
preceding th survey. All columns include the same set of controls used in Table 4, column 6. Industry dummies are
33 two digits SIC codes. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was recorded by the PA; 55
interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week
dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote
weeks with a national or religious holiday.
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Table A.8: Founder and Family CEOs: Summary StatisticsTable	A5	-	Summary	Statistics	(means,	standard	deviation	in	parentheses	except	for	columns	5-7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel	A.	Use	of	Time
All Founder	CEOs Family	CEOs	(2nd	
generation	
onwards)
Professional	CEOs Difference	(4)-(2) Difference	(4)-(3) Difference	(2)-(3)
(T-statistic) (T-statistic) (T-statistic)
Total	weekly	hours	worked	-	recall	measure 51.719 49.371 49.038 52.749 3.711*** 3.378**	 -0.333			
(10.105) (12.452) (9.826) (9.665) (4.07)			 (2.65)			 (-0.21)			
Total	weekly	hours	worked	-	diary	measure 52.009 47.445 48.740 54.543 5.804*** 7.098*** 1.294			
(11.026) (10.714) (10.415) (10.674) (8.12)			 (6.88)			 (1.18)			
Total	weekly	hours	worked	excluding	activities	<	15	mins,	personal	&	travel 41.439 35.805 38.039 44.249 6.210*** 8.444*** 2.234*		
(10.035) (10.410) (9.410) (9.258) (9.88)			 (9.24)			 (2.21)			
Number	of	days	at	work 5.356 5.211 5.339 5.393 0.0539			 0.182**	 0.128			
(0.695) (0.570) (0.662) (0.729) (1.13)			 (2.67)			 (1.94)			
Beginning	of	work	day	(hour) 8.826 9.225 9.273 8.524 -0.749*** -0.701*** 0.0483			
(1.161) (1.271) (1.192) (1.019) (-10.28)			 (-6.82)			 (0.38)			
End	of	work	day	(hours) 18.270 18.008 18.329 18.291 -0.0387			 0.283			 0.321*		
(1.566) (1.713) (1.223) (1.682) (-0.37)			 (1.73)			 (2.24)			
Share	of	time	spent	in	personal	activities 0.101 0.144 0.115 0.086 -0.0299*** -0.0585*** -0.0286*		
(0.099) (0.121) (0.109) (0.084) (-4.76)			 (-6.67)			 (-2.44)			
Panel	B.	CEO	characteristics
Age 50.930 55.367 48.693 51.187 2.494*** -4.180*** -6.674***
(8.458) (7.392) (9.908) (7.425) (4.42)			 (-5.83)			 (-6.91)			
Male 0.961 0.984 0.936 0.970 0.0331*		 -0.0149			 -0.0480*		
(0.193) (0.125) (0.244) (0.172) (2.47)			 (-0.93)			 (-2.12)			
College	degree 0.925 0.852 0.924 0.939 0.0148			 0.0875*** 0.0727*		
(0.264) (0.357) (0.265) (0.239) (0.88)			 (3.45)			 (2.38)			
MBA 0.548 0.297 0.482 0.631 0.149*** 0.334*** 0.185***
(0.498) (0.459) (0.500) (0.483) (4.53)			 (7.22)			 (3.63)			
Tenure	as	CEO	 10.298 21.211 13.398 6.602 -6.796*** -14.61*** -7.813***
(9.550) (10.223) (9.802) (6.677) (-12.79)			 (-20.50)			 (-7.56)			
Tenure	in	firm 17.116 24.320 22.291 13.119 -9.171*** -11.20*** -2.030			
(11.597) (9.928) (10.672) (10.611) (-12.74)			 (-11.03)			 (-1.86)			
Experience	abroad 0.482 0.227 0.458 0.544 0.0866*		 0.318*** 0.231***
(0.500) (0.420) (0.499) (0.498) (2.57)			 (6.76)			 (4.64)			
CEO	holds	positions	in	other	firms 0.418 0.445 0.461 0.392 -0.0688*		 -0.0535			 0.0153			
(0.494) (0.499) (0.499) (0.489) (-2.07)			 (-1.13)			 (0.29)			
Panel	C.	Firm	characteristics
Domestic	or	Foreign	Multinational 0.242 0.109 0.218 0.280 0.0623*		 0.171*** 0.109**	
(0.429) (0.313) (0.414) (0.450) (2.11)			 (4.11)			 (2.69)			
Firm	age 49.185 50.116 25.766 53.320 3.204			 27.55*** 24.35***
(45.360) (34.696) (11.117) (52.412) (1.00)			 (5.92)			 (7.78)			
Listed 0.432 0.579 0.453 0.354 -0.225*** -0.0995*		 0.126*		
(0.496) (0.495) (0.500) (0.478) (-6.89)			 (-2.14)			 (2.43)			
Number	of	Employees 1571.051 633.701 1192.091 1945.432 753.3			 1311.7			 558.4			
(10127.428) (1165.430) (4240.615) (12837.271) (1.04)			 (1.15)			 (1.46)			
Number	of	CEO	direct	reports 7.775 6.594 7.697 8.044 0.347			 1.450*** 1.103**	
(3.774) (2.863) (4.299) (3.604) (1.34)			 (4.30)			 (2.68)			
COO 0.259 0.180 0.176 0.317 0.141*** 0.137**	 -0.00393			
(0.439) (0.385) (0.381) (0.466) (4.77)			 (3.13)			 (-0.10)			
Number	of	sons	in	management	positions 0.103 0.438 0.170 0.005 -0.165*** -0.433*** -0.268***
(0.304) (0.498) (0.376) (0.068) (-10.91)			 (-21.34)			 (-6.22)			
Number	of	daughters	in	management	positions 0.043 0.156 0.073 0.006 -0.0666*** -0.150*** -0.0835**	
(0.203) (0.365) (0.260) (0.078) (-6.05)			 (-9.52)			 (-2.74)			
Data	collected	through	the	CEO	personal	assistant 0.428 0.406 0.361 0.466 0.106**	 0.0602			 -0.0456			
(0.495) (0.493) (0.481) (0.499) (3.18)			 (1.25)			 (-0.91)			
Panel	D.	External	Environment
Located	in	emerging	economies	(=1	if	India	or	Brazil) 0.573 0.844 0.755 0.428 -0.326*** -0.415*** -0.0892*		
(0.495) (0.365) (0.431) (0.495) (-10.18)			 (-9.02)			 (-2.07)			
Lerner	Index 1.227 1.186 1.240 1.229 -0.0112			 0.0426			 0.0538			
(0.412) (0.322) (0.450) (0.408) (-0.38)			 (1.05)			 (1.16)			
Import	Penetration 0.614 0.602 0.651 0.597 -0.0536			 -0.00465			 0.0490			
(0.566) (0.632) (0.621) (0.523) (-1.36)			 (-0.08)			 (0.70)			
Number	of	Observations 1114 128 330 656 986			 784			 458			
Notes: The table shows summary statistics (means, standard deviation in parentheses in columns 1-3; differences and t-statistic in parentheses in column 4) of CEO time use, CEO characteristics, firm and industry
level data for a sample of 1114 CEOs). All variables in Panel A, B and C collected in the CEO time use survey. Import penetration = ln(import/production) in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by averaging
OECD STAN data relative to the 2006–2008 time period (last available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level. Lerner index of competition = (1-profit/sales) in the firm 3 digit
SIC	industry	computed	,	as	in	Aghion	et	al.	(2005),	by	averaging	firm	level	data	in	ORBIS	relative	to	the	2008-2012	time	period	across	Brazil,	France,	Germany,	India,	US	and	UK		at	the	industry	level.
Notes: The table shows summary statistics (means, standard deviation in parentheses in columns 1-3; di↵erences
and t-statistic in parentheses in column 4) of CEO time use, CEO characteristics, firm and industry level data for a
sample of 1114 CEOs). All variables in Panel A, B and C collected in the CEO time use survey. Import penetration
= ln(import/production) in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by averaging OECD STAN data relative to the
2006–2008 time period (last available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry
level. Lerner index of competition = (1-profit/sales) in the firm 3 digit SIC industry computed , as in Aghion et al.
(2005), by averaging firm level data in ORBIS relative to the 2008-2012 time period across Brazil, France, Germany,
India, US and UK at the industry level.
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Table A.9: Founder and Family CEOs: Hours WorkedTable&A6&)&Founders&vs.&Descendants&vs.&Professional&CEOs&)&Cross&sectional&differences&in&Hours&Worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent&Variable
Family&CEO&(2nd&generation&onwards) !0.162*** !0.094*** !0.097*** !0.096*** !0.087*** !0.085*** !0.077***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Founder&CEO !0.228*** !0.160*** !0.128*** !0.115*** !0.090*** !0.095*** !0.088***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
Family&Ownership,&External&CEO 0.041**
(0.020)
Founder&Ownership,&External&CEO !0.021
(0.044)
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms 0.022 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Log(CEO&age) !0.154*** !0.174*** !0.138*** !0.141*** !0.144***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
Log(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) !0.005 !0.007 !0.007 !0.006 !0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
CEO&holds&College&degree 0.051 0.043 0.041 0.054* 0.055*
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
CEO&holds&MBA&degree 0.010 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.005
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
CEO&has&study/work&experience&abroad 0.014 0.005 0.004 !0.003 !0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Log(Employment) 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Firm&age) 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
MNE 0.029 0.024 0.033* 0.032*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Listed !0.032 !0.032 !0.009 !0.004
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
COO&exists !0.009 !0.018 !0.017
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions !0.049** !0.059*** !0.058***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions 0.004 !0.013 !0.012
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant !0.000 0.002
(0.016) (0.017)
R)squared 0.123 0.214 0.230 0.244 0.255 0.347 0.348
Number&of&firms 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114
Test&Family&CEO&(2nd&gen)=&Founder&CEO,&p)value 0.0209 0.0187 0.2966 0.5161 0.9169 0.7167 0.6866
Country&by&Industry&dummies n y y y y y y
Noise&controls n n n n n y y
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust standard errors in parenthesis). The
variable "CEO Hours Worked" is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel)
during the survey week. The variable "Start(End) of the Day" denotes the hour at which the CEO reported to start(end) the work!day. The
variable "Share time spent in personal activities" denotes the share of hours reported by the CEO as dedicated to leisure activities during working
hours. Family CEO (2nd generation)=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm but have not founded it
themselves, and 0 otherwise. Founder CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firmand have founded it
themselves, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was
recorded by the PA; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week
dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote weeks with a national or
religiousYholiday.
Log(Hours&Worked)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust
stand rd errors in parenthesis). The variable ”CEO Hours Worked” is the log of the total hours th CEO devoted to
work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey week. The variable ”Start(End) of
the Day” denotes the hour at which the CEO reported to start(end) the work-day. The variable ”Share time spent in
personal activities” denotes the share of hours reported by the CEO as dedicated to leisure activities during working
hours. Family CEO (2nd generation)=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm but
have not found d it themsel s, and 0 othe wise. Founder CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family
that owns the firm and have founded it themselves, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes.
Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was recorded by the PA; 55 interviewer dummies; a
dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a self reported
score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote weeks with a national or
religious holiday.
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Table A.10: Rain - Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent/Variable
Experiment Baseline Include/
CEO*rain/
interactions
Include/
firm*rain/
interactions
Include/
org*rain/
interactions
Include/
industry*rain/
interactions
Include/
state*rain/
interactions
Family/CEO !0.053** !0.064*** !0.052** !0.057** !0.055** !0.052**
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain 0.030 !0.311 0.140* 0.022 !0.210** 0.000
(0.019) (0.272) (0.084) (0.031) (0.082) (0.000)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*/Family/CEO !0.069*** !0.035 !0.071*** !0.057** !0.070*** !0.058**
(0.023) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*/Log(CEO/age) 0.128*
(0.071)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*/Log(1+CEO/tenure/in/firm) !0.042**
(0.019)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*/CEO/College !0.080
(0.062)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*CEO/studied/worked/abroad 0.014
(0.026)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*/CEO/works/for/other/firms !0.011
(0.038)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*/CEO/MBA 0.022
(0.030)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*/Log(Employment) !0.006
(0.012)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*/Log(Firm/age) !0.025
(0.023)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*/MNE 0.056
(0.037)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*Number/of/direct/reports !0.000
(0.004)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*COO/exists 0.033
(0.031)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*Sons/in/Management !0.024
(0.027)
Dummy=1/if/extreme/rain/*Daughters/in/Management !0.023
(0.055)
Log(Employment) 0.014** 0.014** 0.016** 0.015** 0.014* 0.018**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Firm/age) 0.007 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.002
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
MNE 0.040* 0.040* 0.023 0.039* 0.040* 0.040*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024)
Number/of/direct/reports 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006* 0.007** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
COO/exists !0.027 !0.027 !0.028 !0.038* !0.027 !0.029
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
Number/of/sons/in/management !0.006 !0.007 !0.007 0.003 !0.006 !0.010
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Number/of/daughters/in/management !0.040 !0.040 !0.043* !0.032 !0.044* !0.047*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
CEO/works/for/other/firms !0.002 0.002 !0.002 !0.002 !0.001 0.006
(0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Log(CEO/age) !0.090* !0.137** !0.088* !0.091* !0.091* !0.115**
(0.048) (0.055) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049)
Log(1+CEO/tenure/in/firm) !0.005 0.008 !0.006 !0.006 !0.005 !0.001
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
College/degree 0.063** 0.084*** 0.064** 0.064** 0.059** 0.048
(0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.036)
Dummy/CEO/MBA !0.011 !0.018 !0.010 !0.011 !0.010 !0.017
(0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
CEO/studied/worked/abroad 0.022 0.015 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.020
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
Constant 2.238*** 2.376*** 2.183*** 2.250*** 2.361*** 2.404***
(0.258) (0.281) (0.260) (0.255) (0.256) (0.246)
RRsquared 0.255 0.257 0.256 0.256 0.260 0.277
Observations 3020 3020 3020 3020 3020 3020
Number/of/firms 597 597 597 597 597 597
Industry/dummies y y y y y y
Noise/controls y y y y y y
Test/Rain+Family/CEO*Rain=0/(pRvalue) 0.06 0.19 0.41 0.25 0.00 0.04
Test/joint/significance/of/Rain*CEO/characteristics/(pRvalue) 0.17
Test/joint/significance/of/Rain*/firm/characteristics/(pRvalue) 0.34
Test/joint/significance/of/Rain*/org/characteristics/(pRvalue) 0.71
Test/joint/significance/of/Rain*Industry/interactions/(pRvalue) 0.00
Test/joint/significance/of/Rain*State/interactions/(pRvalue) 0.00
Log(1+CEO/Hours/Worked)/R/Day/Level/
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 6 for details.
53
Table A.11: Sport Events - Robustness ChecksTable&A7b&)&Response&to&Cricket&Shocks&by&Ownership&&)&Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent&Variable
Experiment Baseline Include&
CEO*event&
interactions
Include&
firm*event&
interactions
Include&
org*event&
interactions
Include&
industry*even
t&interactions
Include&
state*event&
interactions
Family&CEO !0.026 !0.032 !0.025 !0.028 !0.024 !0.023
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031)
Sport&event !0.056 0.728 0.410*** !0.131 0.210 !1.206***
(0.065) (0.900) (0.156) (0.111) (0.208) (0.178)
Sport&event&*&Family&CEO !0.158*** !0.126 !0.174** !0.175** !0.173** !0.206**
(0.061) (0.080) (0.076) (0.082) (0.075) (0.091)
Sport&event&*&Log(CEO&age) !0.087
(0.226)
Sport&event&*&Log(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) !0.121***
(0.038)
Sport&event*College 0.073
(0.135)
Sport&event*CEO&studied/worked&abroad !0.149
(0.124)
Sport&event&*&CEO&works&for&other&firms !0.307**
(0.134)
Sport&event&*&CEO&MBA !0.078
(0.102)
Sport&event&*&Log(Employment) !0.099**
(0.041)
Sport&event&*&Log(Firm&age) 0.039
(0.057)
Sport&event&*&MNE 0.102
(0.151)
Sport&event&*Number&of&direct&reports 0.001
(0.015)
Sport&event&*COO 0.251**
(0.112)
Sport&event&*Sons&in&Management !0.004
(0.141)
Sport&event&*Daughters&in&Management 0.036
(0.085)
Log(Employment) 0.008 0.010 0.014* 0.009 0.010 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log(Firm&age) 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.035*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
MNE 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.027
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
CEO&works&for&other&firms 0.000 !0.000 0.000 0.000 !0.000 !0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(CEO&age) !0.026 !0.030 !0.029 !0.044 !0.028 !0.032
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031)
Log(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.002 !0.006
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022)
College&degree !0.052 !0.057 !0.055 !0.056 !0.055 !0.054
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041)
Dummy&CEO&MBA !0.050* !0.032 !0.051* !0.051* !0.045 !0.039
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Did&the&Executive&study&or&worked&abroad? 0.016 0.006 0.016 0.013 0.013 !0.015
(0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.056) (0.059) (0.061)
Number&of&direct&reports !0.018 !0.008 !0.017 !0.015 !0.017 !0.016
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
COO&exists 0.096** 0.098** 0.097** 0.094** 0.090** 0.081*
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)
Number&of&sons&in&management !0.024 !0.025 !0.026 !0.021 !0.025 !0.027
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025)
Number&of&daughters&in&management !0.005 0.004 !0.003 !0.007 !0.003 !0.001
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025)
Constant 1.042*** 0.971*** 1.002*** 1.034*** 0.891*** 0.994***
(0.344) (0.345) (0.349) (0.345) (0.317) (0.326)
R)squared 0.213 0.220 0.216 0.215 0.221 0.236
Observations 3020 3020 3020 3020 3020 3020
Number&of&firms 597 597 597 597 597 597
Industry&dummies y y y y y y
Noise&controls y y y y y y
Test&Sport&event+Family&CEO*Sport&event=0&(p)value) 0.01 0.50 0.16 0.09 0.83 0.00
Test&joint&significance&of&&Sport&Event*CEO&characteristics&(p)value) 0.00
Test&joint&significance&of&&Sport&Event*&firm&characteristics&(p)value) 0.04
Test&joint&significance&of&&Sport&Event*org&&characteristics&(p)value) 0.22
Test&joint&significance&of&&Sport&Event*Industry&interactions&(p)value) 0.00
Test&joint&significance&of&Sport&&Event*State&interactions&(p)value) 0.00
Log(1+Hours&Worked)&)&Day&Level&)&Sport&event&Hours&Only&
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 6 for details.
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Table A.12: The Role of Wealth
Table	6	-	Wealth	Concentration,	Development	and	Contract	Enforcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent	Variable
Family	CEO -0.093*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.087*** -0.090***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Family	CEO*Max	%	of	inheritable	wealth,	
country -0.229** -0.399*
(0.118) (0.208)
ln(GDP),	region	 0.043 0.020
(0.031) (0.034)
Family	CEO*ln(GDP),	region	 -0.018 0.030
(0.019) (0.048)
Family	CEO*Rule	of	Law,	country -0.008 0.008
(0.025) (0.062)
Trust,	region -0.171 -0.144
(0.174) (0.194)
Family	CEO*Trust,	region	 0.074 0.066
(0.121) (0.214)
R-squared 0.349 0.346 0.345 0.345 0.349
Observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
Country	and	Industry	dummies y y y y y
CEO	characteristics y y y y y
Firm	characteristics	 y y y y y
Noise	controls y y y y y
Log(Hours	Worked)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS. In all columns standard errors
under coefficient are clustered by country (wild cluster bootstrap, Webb 6 point distribution). The variable "CEO Hours Worked" is
the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey
week. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies	
are 33 two digits SIC codes. CEO characteristics are a dummy to denote CEOs holding a managerial or board position in another
firm, the log of CEO age, the log of one plus number of years CEO has been employed in the firm, a dummy to denote CEOs holding
a college degree, a dummy to denote CEOs holding an MBA or equivalent degree, a dummy to denote CEO that have worked or
studied abroad. Firm characteristics are the log of one plus firm age, a dummy to denote foreign or domestic multinationals, the
number of people reporting directly to the CEO, a dummy to denote whether the firm employs a COO, the number of CEO's sons
and daughters holding a managerial position in the same firm. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote cases in which the time
use data was recorded by the CEO's Personal Assistant; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to
an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the
week and a dummy to denote weeks with a national or religious holiday. The variable "Max % of inheritable wealth" is a country
specific measure taken from Ellul et al (2010) for all countries, except for India where the measure is set to 0.50 to take into
account the fact that the vast majority of family firms in our sample are organized as Hindu Undivided Family organizations (see
main text for more details). The variables ln(GDP), region" and "Rule of Law, country" are taken from Gennaioli et al (2013). The
variable "Trust, region"is computed using respondent level data from the World Values Survey and measures the % of people
responding "Yes" to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too
careful	in	dealing	with	people?”.
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS. In all columns
standard errors under coe cient are clustered by country (wild cluster bootstrap, Webb 6 point distribution). The
variable ”CEO Hours W rked” is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than
15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey week. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the
family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes. CEO characteristics are
a dummy to denote CEOs holding a managerial or board position in another firm, the log of CEO age, the log of
one plus number of years CEO has be n employed in the firm, a dummy to d note CEOs holdi g a college degree, a
dummy to denote CEOs holding an MBA or equivalent degree, a dummy to denote CEO that have worked or studied
abroad. Firm characteristics are the log of one plus firm age, a dummy to denote foreign or domestic multinationals,
the number of people reporting directly to the CEO, a dummy to denote whether the firm employs a COO, the
number of CEO’s so s and daughters holding a managerial ositio in the same firm. Noise controls include: a
dummy to denote cases in which the time use data was recorded by the CEO’s Personal Assistant; 55 interviewer
dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a
self reported score giv n by the CEO to rank the representativeness of h week and a dummy o denote weeks with
a national or religious holiday. The variable ”Max % of inheritable wealth” is a country specific measure taken from
Ellul et al (2010) for all countries, except for India where the measure is set to 0.50 to take into account the fact
that the vast majority of family firms in our sample are organized as Hindu Undivided Family organizations (see
main text for more details). The variables ln(GDP), region” and ”Rule of Law, country” are taken from Gennaioli et
al (2013). The variable ”Trust, region”is computed using respondent level data from the World Values Survey and
measures the % of people responding ”Yes” to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”.
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